Introduction

What I propose to do, in this and the following chapter, is to turn back to the explicitly pragmatic arguments that were surveyed in Chapter 4 and consider how compelling they really are when recast in terms of the framework of distinctions and conditions developed in Chapters 6 through 9. Since each of these arguments purports to show that the agent who violates either CF or CIND can be caught in a pragmatic difficulty, what I am particularly interested in determining is whether this sort of difficulty is one that arises for the agent regardless of whether he adopts a myopic, sophisticated, or resolute approach or whether, instead, the alleged pragmatic difficulty can be seen to be the consequence of adopting one, rather than another, of these approaches. In particular, what I want to determine is whether any one or another of these approaches can be shown to pass the test of not making the agent liable to be placed in a pragmatically untenable position.

My remarks at the very end of Chapter 5 hinted at what I am now in a position – thanks to the formal developments of Chapters 6 through 9 – to establish more firmly, that the pragmatic arguments presented there effectively beg the question of alternative approaches and assume that the agent behaves in a myopic fashion.