Karadžić returned to Sarajevo in early March 1992 in the strongest position he had yet enjoyed, owing to his successes in Banja Luka, Belgrade, and Sarajevo. By directing the building and dismantling of the barricades in Sarajevo, he had demonstrated the Bosnian government’s vulnerability and his willingness to use force to achieve his aims. In ending the ARK separatist threat in Banja Luka, he had strengthened his control over the SDS. And in securing promises of support from the federal presidency in Belgrade, he knew the JNA stood ready to support his actions to contest Bosnia’s independence. Even in his strengthened position, however, Karadžić faced major challenges with the approach of April 6, the scheduled date for Europe’s recognition of Bosnia’s independence. To meet those challenges, Karadžić became a strategic multitasker. In this chapter we trace his simultaneous quests for a negotiated agreement to partition Bosnia and for Bosnian Serb readiness for armed takeover, as violent incidents proliferated and popular apprehension surged during March.

The Quest for Negotiated Partition

Facing the de facto deadline of April 6, EC negotiator Jose Cutileiro made another attempt to secure a negotiated partition of the soon-to-be-independent state. In late February, Cutileiro’s efforts to reach an EC-sponsored agreement had foundered on the rock of Bosnian Serb intransigence (described in Chapter 9). As he convened the fifth round of talks in the historic Konak building in Sarajevo on March 16, he was aware that April 6 would end his best chance to avert war. If the EC recognition were to become effective on April 6 without an agreement, Izetbegović and the Bosnian government would have little incentive to grant concessions to EC negotiators, let alone agree to partition their newly-recognized state. But Karadžić and the SDS, backed by the JNA and the Serbian government, had threatened war if Bosnia were to become independent without a tripartite partition agreement in place.