Throughout this book, I have argued that managerial organizations are likely to dominate the politics of corporate control. This prediction flows from the fact that the rules governing regimes of corporate control are typically of low political salience. In contrast with work that emphasizes the centrality of political parties to corporate governance reform, I argue that political parties have few incentives to invest in the development of expertise and the promotion of reforms, so long as these questions are of low political salience. Neither voters nor the media care, which means it is not rational for politicians to thwart the political initiatives of managers. Politicians do not generally have the stomach for a fight that will generate little in the way of electoral rewards. We expect political parties of left and right defer to managerial lobbies in the area of corporate control, so long as voters are not attuned to it.

The findings of the previous chapters add to the accumulating evidence that political parties do not hold consistent positions on corporate governance. Social Democrats are not in favor of reforming corporate governance across the industrialized democracies, pace the argument of John Cioffi and Martin Höpner. In the Netherlands, in Sweden, and in France, as well as in the German case that is central to their argument, Social Democratic parties readily switch their positions on corporate governance. Neither is it true, as implied by Mark Roe's empirical work, that Social Democratic parties are the upholders of patient capital. Where reformist neoliberal parties do try to overturn the status quo favored by managerial organizations, they are not likely to succeed. Given its low political salience, the story of corporate governance politics is not generally one in which political parties play a leading role.