Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-45l2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T15:57:11.684Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
This chapter is part of a book that is no longer available to purchase from Cambridge Core

6 - VOTING

Arye L. Hillman
Arye L. Hillman
Affiliation:
Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Get access

Summary

In our normative analysis, we have until now considered personal decisions in markets (or, in the case of externalities, personal behavior in the absence of markets or in creating markets). The personal decisions were accompanied – and influenced – by public finance and public-policy decisions. Governments made the decisions about public finance and public policy, whereas people made the personal decisions that determined their own personal outcomes. In this chapter, we study collective decisions about public finance and public finance made by voting. People do not, therefore, determine their own personal outcomes by making personal decisions. Personal outcomes are determined through the collective outcome of decisions of voting.

Because the probability of one person's vote being decisive in large voting populations is effectively zero, the reason why people vote may not be that they expect to influence the outcome of voting. Voting may be expressive: voters may express themselves by identifying with a policy or with a candidate, as they might, for example, cheer for and identify with a sports team and be happy or sad according to whether “their” team wins; or, by expressing support for a candidate or political party, a voter may be communicating with and seeking approval from other people. People may also vote as an act of civic duty: they have been taught that taking the time to vote is correct pro-social behavior. Their utility from voting may be from democratic participation. We shall return to the question of why people vote.

Type
Chapter
Information
Public Finance and Public Policy
Responsibilities and Limitations of Government
 , pp. 405 - 488
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Merrill, S., and Grofman, B., 1999. A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Condorcet, M., 1785. Essai sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la Probabilité des Decisions Rendues á la Pluraliste des Voix. Paris.Google Scholar
Nitzan, S., and Paroush, J., 1985. Collective Decision Making: An Economic Outlook. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.Google Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G., 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guttman, J. L., 1998. Unanimity and majority rule: The calculus of consent reconsidered. European Journal of Political Economy 14:189–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
May, K. O., 1952. A set of independent, necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision. Econometrica 20:680–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mueller, D. C., 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wickström, B.-A., 1986. Optimal majorities for decision rules of varying importance. Public Choice 48:273–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bergstrom, T. C., 1979. When does majority rule provide public goods efficiently?Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81:217–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowen, H. R., 1946. The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58:27–48. Reprinted in K. J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky (Eds.), 1969. Readings in Welfare Economics. Richard D. Irwin, Homewood IL, pp. 115–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Black, D., 1948. On the rationale of group decision making. Journal of Political Economy 56:23–36. Reprinted in K. J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky (Eds.), 1969. Readings in Welfare Economics. Richard D. Irwin, Homewood IL, pp. 133–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Congleton, R. D., and Tollison, R. D., 1999. The stability-inducing properties of very unstable coalitions: Avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent seeking. European Journal of Political Economy 15:193–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, W., 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. Yale University Press, New Haven CT.Google Scholar
Tullock, G., 1981. Why so much stability?Public Choice 37:189–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., 1954. Social choice, democracy, and free markets. Journal of Political Economy 62:114–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kochin, M. S., and Kochin, L. A., 1998. When is buying votes wrong?Public Choice 97:645–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernholz, P., 1977. Prisoners' dilemma, logrolling, and cyclical group preferences. Public Choice 29:73–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stratmann, T., 1992. The effects of logrolling on Congressional voting. American Economic Review 82:1162–76.Google Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., and Faith, R. L., 1987. Secession and the limits of taxation: Towards a theory of internal exit. American Economic Review 77:1023–31.Google Scholar
Kollman, K., Miller, J. H., and Page, S. E., 1997. Political institutions and sorting in a Tiebout model. American Economic Review 87:977–92.Google Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G., and Tabellini, G., 1997. Separation of powers and political accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:1163–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, S., Fry, T. R. L., and Jarvis, K., 2006. Direct democracy in Australia: Voter behavior in the choice between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. European Journal of Political Economy 22:86–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Karahan, G. R., and Shughart, W. F. II, 2004. Under two flags: Symbolic voting in the State of Mississippi. Public Choice 118:105–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayer, W., 1984. Endogenous tariff formation. American Economic Review 74:970–85.Google Scholar
Weck-Hannemann, H., 1990. Protectionism in direct democracy. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146:389–418.Google Scholar
Feld, L. P., and Kirchgässner, G., 2000. Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: A report on the Swiss experience. European Journal of Political Economy 16:287–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nurmi, H., 1999. Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them. Springer, Berlin.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrogorski, M., 1903. La démocratie et l'organisation des partis politiques. Calmann-Levy, Paris (2 volumes).Google Scholar
Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row, New York.Google Scholar
Hotelling, H., 1929. Stability in competition. Economic Journal 39:41–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roemer, J., 2001. Political Competition: Theory and Applications. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Selten, R., 1971. Anwendungen der Spieltheorie auf die Politische Wissenschaft. In Maier, H. (Ed.), Politik und Wissenschaft. C. H. Beck, München, pp. 287–320.Google Scholar
Ursprung, H. W., 1991. Economic policies and political competition. In Hillman, A. L. (Ed.), Markets and Politicians: Politicized Economic Choice. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston and Dordrecht, pp. 1–26.Google Scholar
Brennan, G., and Hamlin, A., 1998. Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice 95:149–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bandyopadhyay, S., and Oak, M. P., 2008. Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy. European Journal of Political Economy 24:554–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, D., and Diermeier, D., 2001. Elections, governments and parliaments under proportional representation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116:933–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brams, S., and Fishburn, P. C., 1986. Approval Voting. Birkhäuser, Boston.Google Scholar
Nurmi, H., 1987. Comparing Voting Systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1959. Problems of majority voting. Journal of Political Economy 67:571–9. Reprinted in Arrow, K. J. and Scitovsky, T. (Eds.), 1969. Readings in Welfare Economics. Richard D. Irwin, Homewood IL, pp. 169–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rae, D. W., 1969. Decision rules and individual values in constitutional choice. American Political Science Review 63:40–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taylor, M. J., 1969. Proof of a theorem on majority rule. Behavioral Science 14:228–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowles, R., and Jones, P., 1991. Political participation and the limits to redistribution. European Journal of Political Economy 7:127–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meltzer, A. H., and Richard, S. F., 1981. A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy 89:914–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harms, P., and Zink, S., 2003. Limits to redistribution: A survey. European Journal of Political Economy 19:651–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benabou, R., and Ok, E. A., 2001. Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: The POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116:447–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirschman, A. O., 1973. The changing tolerance for income inequality in the course of economic development. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87:544–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fuest, C., and Thum, M., 2001. Immigration and skill formation in unionized markets. European Journal of Political Economy 17:557–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansen, J. D., 2003. Immigration and income redistribution in welfare states. European Journal of Political Economy 19:735–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roemer, J. E., 1998. Why the poor do not appropriate the rich: An old argument in new garb. Journal of Public Economics 70:399–426.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Owen, G., and Grofman, B., 1984. To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting. Public Choice 42:311–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glazer, A., 1987. A new theory of voting: Why vote when millions of others do. Decision and Theory 22:257–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guttman, J. L., Hilger, N., and Shachmurove, Y., 1994. Voting as investment vs. voting as consumption: New evidence. Kyklos 47:197–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schuessler, A. A., 2000. A Logic of Expressive Choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.Google Scholar
Heckelman, J. C., 1995. The effects of the secret ballot on voter turnout rates. Public Choice 82:107–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matsusaka, J. G., and Palda, F., 1999. Voter turnout: How much can we explain?Public Choice 98:431–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Breyer, F., and Ursprung, H. W., 1998. Are the rich too rich to be appropriated? Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution. Public Choice 94:135–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abrams, B. A., and Settle, R. F., 1999. Women's suffrage and the growth of the welfare state. Public Choice 100:289–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aidt, T. S., and Dallal, B., 2008. Female voting power: The contribution of women's suffrage to the growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869–1960). Public Choice 134:391–417.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edlund, L., and Pande, R., 2002. Why have women become left-wing? The political gender gap and the decline in marriage. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:917–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Husted, T. A., and Kenny, L. W., 1997. The effect of the expansion of the franchise on the size of government. Journal of Political Economy 105:54–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lott, J. R., and Kenny, L. W., 1999. Did women's suffrage change the size and scope of government?Journal of Political Economy 107:1163–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, J. Q., 2002. The Marriage Problem: How Our Culture Has Weakened Families. Harper Collins, New York.Google Scholar
Mueller, D., 2003. Interest groups, redistribution and the size of government. In Winer, S. L. and Shibata, H. (Eds.), Political Economy and Public Finance. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham U.K., pp. 123–46.Google Scholar
Frey, B. S., and Pommerehne, W. W., 1982. How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?Public Choice 38:253–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frey, B. S., 1971. Why do high-income people participate more in politics?Public Choice 11:101–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milanovic, B., 2000. The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income distribution: An empirical test with the required data. European Journal of Political Economy 16:367–410.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, G., 1970. Director's law of public income distribution. Journal of Law and Economics 13:1–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merrill, S., and Grofman, B., 1999. A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Condorcet, M., 1785. Essai sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la Probabilité des Decisions Rendues á la Pluraliste des Voix. Paris.Google Scholar
Nitzan, S., and Paroush, J., 1985. Collective Decision Making: An Economic Outlook. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.Google Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G., 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guttman, J. L., 1998. Unanimity and majority rule: The calculus of consent reconsidered. European Journal of Political Economy 14:189–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
May, K. O., 1952. A set of independent, necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision. Econometrica 20:680–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mueller, D. C., 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wickström, B.-A., 1986. Optimal majorities for decision rules of varying importance. Public Choice 48:273–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bergstrom, T. C., 1979. When does majority rule provide public goods efficiently?Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81:217–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowen, H. R., 1946. The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58:27–48. Reprinted in K. J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky (Eds.), 1969. Readings in Welfare Economics. Richard D. Irwin, Homewood IL, pp. 115–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Black, D., 1948. On the rationale of group decision making. Journal of Political Economy 56:23–36. Reprinted in K. J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky (Eds.), 1969. Readings in Welfare Economics. Richard D. Irwin, Homewood IL, pp. 133–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Congleton, R. D., and Tollison, R. D., 1999. The stability-inducing properties of very unstable coalitions: Avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent seeking. European Journal of Political Economy 15:193–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, W., 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. Yale University Press, New Haven CT.Google Scholar
Tullock, G., 1981. Why so much stability?Public Choice 37:189–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., 1954. Social choice, democracy, and free markets. Journal of Political Economy 62:114–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kochin, M. S., and Kochin, L. A., 1998. When is buying votes wrong?Public Choice 97:645–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernholz, P., 1977. Prisoners' dilemma, logrolling, and cyclical group preferences. Public Choice 29:73–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stratmann, T., 1992. The effects of logrolling on Congressional voting. American Economic Review 82:1162–76.Google Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., and Faith, R. L., 1987. Secession and the limits of taxation: Towards a theory of internal exit. American Economic Review 77:1023–31.Google Scholar
Kollman, K., Miller, J. H., and Page, S. E., 1997. Political institutions and sorting in a Tiebout model. American Economic Review 87:977–92.Google Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G., and Tabellini, G., 1997. Separation of powers and political accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:1163–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, S., Fry, T. R. L., and Jarvis, K., 2006. Direct democracy in Australia: Voter behavior in the choice between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. European Journal of Political Economy 22:86–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Karahan, G. R., and Shughart, W. F. II, 2004. Under two flags: Symbolic voting in the State of Mississippi. Public Choice 118:105–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayer, W., 1984. Endogenous tariff formation. American Economic Review 74:970–85.Google Scholar
Weck-Hannemann, H., 1990. Protectionism in direct democracy. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146:389–418.Google Scholar
Feld, L. P., and Kirchgässner, G., 2000. Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: A report on the Swiss experience. European Journal of Political Economy 16:287–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nurmi, H., 1999. Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them. Springer, Berlin.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrogorski, M., 1903. La démocratie et l'organisation des partis politiques. Calmann-Levy, Paris (2 volumes).Google Scholar
Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row, New York.Google Scholar
Hotelling, H., 1929. Stability in competition. Economic Journal 39:41–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roemer, J., 2001. Political Competition: Theory and Applications. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Selten, R., 1971. Anwendungen der Spieltheorie auf die Politische Wissenschaft. In Maier, H. (Ed.), Politik und Wissenschaft. C. H. Beck, München, pp. 287–320.Google Scholar
Ursprung, H. W., 1991. Economic policies and political competition. In Hillman, A. L. (Ed.), Markets and Politicians: Politicized Economic Choice. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston and Dordrecht, pp. 1–26.Google Scholar
Brennan, G., and Hamlin, A., 1998. Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice 95:149–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bandyopadhyay, S., and Oak, M. P., 2008. Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy. European Journal of Political Economy 24:554–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, D., and Diermeier, D., 2001. Elections, governments and parliaments under proportional representation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116:933–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brams, S., and Fishburn, P. C., 1986. Approval Voting. Birkhäuser, Boston.Google Scholar
Nurmi, H., 1987. Comparing Voting Systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1959. Problems of majority voting. Journal of Political Economy 67:571–9. Reprinted in Arrow, K. J. and Scitovsky, T. (Eds.), 1969. Readings in Welfare Economics. Richard D. Irwin, Homewood IL, pp. 169–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rae, D. W., 1969. Decision rules and individual values in constitutional choice. American Political Science Review 63:40–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taylor, M. J., 1969. Proof of a theorem on majority rule. Behavioral Science 14:228–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowles, R., and Jones, P., 1991. Political participation and the limits to redistribution. European Journal of Political Economy 7:127–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meltzer, A. H., and Richard, S. F., 1981. A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy 89:914–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harms, P., and Zink, S., 2003. Limits to redistribution: A survey. European Journal of Political Economy 19:651–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benabou, R., and Ok, E. A., 2001. Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: The POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116:447–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirschman, A. O., 1973. The changing tolerance for income inequality in the course of economic development. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87:544–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fuest, C., and Thum, M., 2001. Immigration and skill formation in unionized markets. European Journal of Political Economy 17:557–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansen, J. D., 2003. Immigration and income redistribution in welfare states. European Journal of Political Economy 19:735–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roemer, J. E., 1998. Why the poor do not appropriate the rich: An old argument in new garb. Journal of Public Economics 70:399–426.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Owen, G., and Grofman, B., 1984. To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting. Public Choice 42:311–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glazer, A., 1987. A new theory of voting: Why vote when millions of others do. Decision and Theory 22:257–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guttman, J. L., Hilger, N., and Shachmurove, Y., 1994. Voting as investment vs. voting as consumption: New evidence. Kyklos 47:197–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schuessler, A. A., 2000. A Logic of Expressive Choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.Google Scholar
Heckelman, J. C., 1995. The effects of the secret ballot on voter turnout rates. Public Choice 82:107–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matsusaka, J. G., and Palda, F., 1999. Voter turnout: How much can we explain?Public Choice 98:431–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Breyer, F., and Ursprung, H. W., 1998. Are the rich too rich to be appropriated? Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution. Public Choice 94:135–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abrams, B. A., and Settle, R. F., 1999. Women's suffrage and the growth of the welfare state. Public Choice 100:289–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aidt, T. S., and Dallal, B., 2008. Female voting power: The contribution of women's suffrage to the growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869–1960). Public Choice 134:391–417.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edlund, L., and Pande, R., 2002. Why have women become left-wing? The political gender gap and the decline in marriage. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:917–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Husted, T. A., and Kenny, L. W., 1997. The effect of the expansion of the franchise on the size of government. Journal of Political Economy 105:54–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lott, J. R., and Kenny, L. W., 1999. Did women's suffrage change the size and scope of government?Journal of Political Economy 107:1163–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, J. Q., 2002. The Marriage Problem: How Our Culture Has Weakened Families. Harper Collins, New York.Google Scholar
Mueller, D., 2003. Interest groups, redistribution and the size of government. In Winer, S. L. and Shibata, H. (Eds.), Political Economy and Public Finance. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham U.K., pp. 123–46.Google Scholar
Frey, B. S., and Pommerehne, W. W., 1982. How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?Public Choice 38:253–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frey, B. S., 1971. Why do high-income people participate more in politics?Public Choice 11:101–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milanovic, B., 2000. The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income distribution: An empirical test with the required data. European Journal of Political Economy 16:367–410.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, G., 1970. Director's law of public income distribution. Journal of Law and Economics 13:1–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • VOTING
  • Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
  • Book: Public Finance and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813788.007
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • VOTING
  • Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
  • Book: Public Finance and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813788.007
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • VOTING
  • Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
  • Book: Public Finance and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813788.007
Available formats
×