The many failures of response by the international community were followed by a very delayed but effective response in Bosnia. Once serious bombing of the Serb military began, it speedily led to a halting of violence, followed by the Dayton peace negotiations. Even in Kosovo, the response was delayed: Warnings about potential violence in Kosovo had started to come in the late 1980s. The bombing began after negotiations and after significant ethnic cleansing had taken place (Adelman, 1999). But, at least, there was a bystander response before large-scale violence.

A likely reason for this was awareness of, attention to, and a commitment that has developed in Bosnia to stopping Serb aggression, an evolution in a positive direction. The same leaders were on the scene. The failure of a response in Rwanda, and the apology by President Clinton to the Rwandan people that acknowledged responsibility, may have added at least to his motivation to act. This evolution has not led, however, to the creation of international institutions that might be helpful in other crises. The specificity of concern and commitment does not offer the hope of more active bystandership by the community of nations.

Given that bombing stopped Serb aggression in Bosnia, it was understandable that the same method was tried in Kosovo. But this was a different situation, given the symbolic meaning of Kosovo for Serbs, their view of it as essential to their identity.