Chapter 5 illustrates the problematic implications of the mainstream interpretation of the PCO. By importing the case law on exceptions into the domain of the PCO, this volume shows how the former cannot easily be reconciled with the wording of the PCO, the intention of the drafters as well as the economic rationale behind prudential regulation. The economic analysis, combined with the negotiating history of the PCO, shows that the main will of the negotiators was to avoid Type I errors (false positives), i.e. situations in which the court finds against a defendant even though the behaviour of the latter was not unlawful. The classification of the PCO as an exception would imply a different rationale for the provision, namely that of avoiding Type II errors (false negatives). In other words, in the realm of “exceptions”, a legal system considers erring in favour of the complainant a less harmful option than erring in favour of the Member invoking the exception in the event of a dispute. The discussion conducted in Chapter 5 proves that there are solid textual, contextual, historical and economic reason that permit an alternative interpretation of the PCO.