Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-t6hkb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-11T20:30:12.148Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2020

Robert Trueman
Robert Trueman
Affiliation:
University of York
Get access

Summary

A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Chapter
Information
Properties and Propositions
The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic
 , pp. 211 - 222
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Anscombe, Elizabeth. 1959. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. London: Hutchinson.Google Scholar
Armstrong, David. 1978a. Nominalism and Realism. Universals & Scientific Realism, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Armstrong, David. A Theory of Universals. Universals & Scientific Realism, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Armstrong, David. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, David. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Armstrong, David. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Audi, Paul. 2012. A clarification and defense of the notion of grounding. Pages 101–21 of: Correia and Schnieder 2012.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bach, Kent. 1997. Do belief reports report beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78, 215–41.Google Scholar
Bacon, Andrew. 2019. Substitution structures. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48, 1017–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baldwin, Thomas. 1991. The identity theory of truth. Mind, 100, 35–52.Google Scholar
Baldwin, Thomas. (ed). 1993. G.E. Moore: Selected Writings. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Barker, Chris, and Jacobson, Pauline (eds). 2007. Direct Compositionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barker, Stephen, and Jago, Mark. 2012. Being positive about negative facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85, 117–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baxter, Donald. 2001. Instantiation as partial identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 449–64.Google Scholar
Beaney, Michael (ed). 1997. The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Beaney, Michael (ed). The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beebee, Helen, and Dodd, Julian (eds). 2005. Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benacerraf, Paul. 1973. Mathematical truth. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 661–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, Karen. 2017. Making Things Up. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bergmann, Gustav. 1960. Ineffability, ontology, and method. Philosophical Review, 69, 18–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blanchette, Patricia. 2012. Frege’s Conception of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Boolos, George. 1975. On second-order logic. The Journal of Philosophy, 72, 509–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boolos, George. To be is to be the value of a variable (or to be some values of some variables). The Journal of Philosophy, 81, 430–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boolos, George. Nominalist platonism. The Philosophical Review, 94, 327–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bradley, Francis Herbert. 1893. Appearance and Reality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Bradley, Francis Herbert. 1907. On truth and copying. Mind, 16, 165–80.Google Scholar
Braithwaite, Richard. (ed). 1931. The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Brentano, Franz. 1874. Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.Google Scholar
Button, Tim. 2017. Exclusion problems and the cardinality of logical space. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 611–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Button, Tim, and Walsh, Sean. 2018. Philosophy and Model Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, John. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Candlish, Stewart. 1989. The truth about F. H. Bradley. Mind, 98, 331–48.Google Scholar
Candlish, Stewart. Resurrecting the identity theory of truth. Bradley Studies, 1, 116–24.Google Scholar
Candlish, Stewart. Identifying the identity theory of truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 233–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Candlish, Stewart. A prolegomenon to an identity theory of truth. Philosophy, 74, 199–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cartwright, Richard. 1987a. A neglected theory of truth. Pages 71–93 of: Cartwright 1987b.Google Scholar
Cartwright, Richard. Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Chalmers, David, Manley, David, and Wasserman, Ryan (eds). 2009. Metameta-physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chierchia, Gennaro, and Turner, Raymond. 1988. Semantics and property theory. Linguistics and Philosophy, 11, 261–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Correia, Fabrice, and Schnieder, Benjamin (eds). 2012. Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crary, Alice, and Read, Rupert (eds). 2000. The New Wittgenstein. London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 2005. Truth & Predication. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Devitt, Michael. 1980. ‘Ostrich nominalism’ or ‘mirage realism’? Pages 93–100 of: Mellor and Oliver 1997.Google Scholar
Diamond, Cora. 1991. The Realistic Spirit. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dodd, Julian. 1995. McDowell and identity theories of truth. Analysis, 55, 160–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dodd, Julian. 1999a. Farewell to states of affairs. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77, 146–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dodd, Julian. 1999b. Hornsby on the identity theory of truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 225–32.Google Scholar
Dodd, Julian. 2000. An Identity Theory of Truth. Great Britain: Macmillan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dodd, Julian. 2007. Negative truths and truthmaker principles. Synthese, 156, 383–401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dolby, David. 2009. The Reference Principle: a defence. Analysis, 69, 286–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dorr, Cian. 2016. To be F is to be G. Philosophical Perspectives, 30, 39–134.Google Scholar
Dudman, Victor. 1976. Bedeutung for predicates. Pages 71–84 of: Schirn 1976.Google Scholar
Dummett, Michael. 1981a. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. Londond: Duck-worth.Google Scholar
Dummett, Michael. 1981b. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
Edwards, Paul (ed). 1967. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Press.Google Scholar
Evans, Gareth. 1977. Pronouns, quantifiers, and relative clauses (I). Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7, 467–536.Google Scholar
Fine, Kit. 2000. Neutral relations. The Philosophical Review, 109, 1–33.Google Scholar
Fine, Kit. 2012. Guide to ground. Pages 37–80 of: Correia and Schnieder 2012.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fish, William. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Foster, John. 2000. The Nature of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1879. Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formel-sprache des reinen Denkens. Halle: Nerbert.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1884. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Breslau: Koebner.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1891. Function and concept. Pages 130–48 of: Beaney 1997.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1891–5. Comments on sense and reference. Pages 172–80 of: Beaney 1997.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1892a. On concept and object. Pages 181–93 of: Beaney 1997.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1892b. On sense and reference. Pages 151–71 of: Beaney 1997.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1893. Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. I. Jena: Pohle.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1906a. A brief survey of my logical doctrines. Pages 299–300 of: Beaney 1997.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1906b. Foundations of geometry: second series. Pages 293–340 of: McGuinness 1984.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1906c. Introduction to logic. Pages 293–8 of: Beaney 1997.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1918. Thought. Pages 325–45 of: Beaney 1997.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob. 1923. Compound thoughts. Pages 390–406 of: McGuinness 1984.Google Scholar
Furth, Montgomery. 1968. Two types of denotation. Pages 9–45 of: Rescher 1968.Google Scholar
Gaskin, Richard. 1995. Bradley’s Regress, the copula and the unity of the proposition. The Philosophical Quarterly, 45, 161–80.Google Scholar
Gaskin, Richard. 2008. The Unity of the Proposition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geach, Peter. 1975. Names and identity. Pages 139–58 of: Guttenplan 1975.Google Scholar
Geach, Peter. 1976. Saying and showing in Frege and Wittgenstein. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 28, 54–70.Google Scholar
Geurts, Bart. 2006. Take ‘five’: the meaning and use of a number a word. Pages 311–29 of: Vogeleer and Tasmowski 2006.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodman, Jeremy. 2017. Reality is not structured. Analysis, 77, 43–53.Google Scholar
Gray, Aidan. 2017. Names in strange places. Linguistics and Philosophy, 40, 429–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Groenendijk, Jeroen, and Stokhof, Martin. 1989. Type-shifting rules and the semantics of interrogatives. Pages 421–56 of: Portner and Partee 2002.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grover, Dorothy. 1992a. Prosentences and propositional quantification: a response to Zimmerman. Pages 137–45 of: Grover 1992b.Google Scholar
Grover, Dorothy. 1992b. A Prosentential Theory of Truth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Grover, Dorothy, Camp, Joseph, and Belnap, Nuel. 1975. A prosentential theory of truth. Pages 70–120 of: Grover 1992b.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guttenplan, Samuel (ed). 1975. Mind and Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Hacker, Peter. 1972. Insight and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hale, Bob. 1994. Singular terms (2). Pages 48–71 of: Hale and Wright 2001.Google Scholar
Hale, Bob. 1996. Singular terms (1). Pages 31–47 of: Hale and Wright 2001.Google Scholar
Hale, Bob. 2010. The bearable lightness of being. Axiomathes, 20, 399–422.Google Scholar
Hale, Bob. 2013. Necessary Beings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hale, Bob. 2020. Essays on Essence and Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hale, Bob, and Linnebo, Øystein. 2020. Ontological categories and the problem of expressibility. Pages 73–103 of: Hale 2020.Google Scholar
Hale, Bob, and Wright, Crispin. 2001. The Reason’s Proper Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hale, Bob, and Wright, Crispin. 2002. Benacerraf’s dilemma revisited. European Journal of Philosophy, 10, 101–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hale, Bob, and Wright, Crispin. 2012. Horse sense. The Journal of Philosophy, 109, 85–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hanks, Peter. 2011. Structured propositions as types. Mind, 120, 11–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hanks, Peter. 2015. Propositional Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heck, Richard, and May, Robert. 2006. Frege’s contribution to philosophy of language. Pages 3–39 of: Lepore and Smith 2006.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heck, Richard, and May, Robert. 2013. The function is unsaturated. Pages 825–50 of: Beaney 2013.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heim, Irene, and Kratzer, Angelika. 1998. Semantics in Generative Grammar. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Hirsch, Eli. 2011. Quantifier Variance and Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hofweber, Thomas. 2007. Innocent statements and their metaphysically loaded counterparts. Philosophers’ Imprint, 7, 1–33.Google Scholar
Hofweber, Thomas. 2016a. From Remnants to Things, and back again. Pages 54–72 of: Ostertag 2016.Google Scholar
Hofweber, Thomas. 2016b. Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. 1997. Truth: the identity theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 97, 1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. 1999. The facts in question: a response to Dodd and to Candlish. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 241–5.Google Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. 2005. Truth without truthmaking entities. Pages 33–48 of: Beebee and Dodd 2005.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, Paul. 1998a. Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, Paul. 1998b. Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Horwich, Paul. 2005. Reflections on Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, Paul. 2008. Truth and being. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 22, 258–73.Google Scholar
Horwich, Paul. 2010. Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jackson, Frank, and Priest, Graham (eds). 2004. Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jago, Mark. 2018. What Truth Is. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jenkins, Carrie. 2011. Is metaphysical dependence irreflexive? The Monist, 94, 267–76.Google Scholar
Johnston, Colin. 2013. Judgment and the identity theory of truth. Philosophical Studies, 166, 381–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones, Nicholas. 2016. A higher-order solution to the problem of the concept horse. Ergo, 3, 132–66.Google Scholar
Jones, Nicholas. 2018. Nominalist realism. Noûs, 52, 808–35.Google Scholar
Jones, Nicholas. 2019 . Propositions and cognitive relations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 119, 157–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, Jeffrey. 2002. Designating propositions. Noûs, 111, 341–71.Google Scholar
King, Jeffrey. 2007. The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, Jeffrey. 2009. Questions of unity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109, 257–77.Google Scholar
King, Jeffrey. 2013. Propositional unity: what’s the problem, who has it and who solves it? Philosophical Studies, 165, 71–93.Google Scholar
King, Jeffrey, Soames, Scott, and Speaks, Jeff. 2014. New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Klein, Udo, and Sternefeld, Wolfgang. 2017. Same same but different: an alphabetically innocent compositional predicate logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 65–95.Google Scholar
Krämer, Stephan. 2014a. On What There Is for Things to Be. Studies in Theoretical Philosophy, vol. 1. Frankfurt: Klostermann.Google Scholar
Krämer, Stephan. 2014b. Semantic values in higher-order semantics. Philosophical Studies, 168, 709–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kremer, Michael. 2001. The purpose of Tractarian nonsense. Noûs, 35, 39–73.Google Scholar
Künne, Wolfgang. 2003. Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Langacker, Ronald. 2002. Concept, Image, and Symbol. 2nd ed. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.Google Scholar
Larson, Richard, and Segal, Gabriel. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leng, Mary, Paseau, Alex, and Potter, Michael (eds). 2007. Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lepore, Ernest, and Smith, Barry (eds). 2006. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Levine, James. 2013. Logic and solipsism. Pages 170–238 of: Sullivan and Potter 2013.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David. 1983. New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61, 343–77.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. 1986a. Against structural universals. Pages 78–107 of: Lewis 1999.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David. 1986b. A comment on Armstrong and Forrest. Pages 108–10 of: Lewis 1999.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. 1986c. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. 1999. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David. 2001a. Forget about the ‘correspondence theory of truth’. Analysis, 61, 275–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David. 2001b. Truthmaking and difference-making. Noûs, 35, 602–15.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. 2002. Tensing the copula. Mind, 111, 1–13.Google Scholar
Liebesman, David. 2015. Predication as ascription. Mind, 124, 517–69.Google Scholar
Liggins, David. 2016. Deflationism, conceptual explanation and the truth asymmetry. The Philosophical Quarterly, 66, 84–101.Google Scholar
Lillehammer, Hallvard, and Mellor, David Hugh (eds). 2005. Ramsey’s Legacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Linnebo, Øystein. 2006. Sets, properties, and unrestricted quantification. Pages 149–78 of: Rayo and Uzquiano 2006.Google Scholar
Linnebo, Øystein, and Rayo, Agustín. 2012. Hierarchies ontological and ideological. Mind, 121, 269–308.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Long, Peter. 1969. Are predicates and relational expressions incomplete? The Philosophical Review, 78, 90–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lowe, Edward Jonathan. 2006. The Four Category Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 1998. Where are particulars and universals? Dialectica, 52, 203–27.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2005a. The particular-universal distinction: a dogma of metaphysics? Mind, 114, 565–614.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2005b. Ramsey on universals. Pages 83–104 of: Lillehammer and Mellor 2005.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2006. Predicate reference. Pages 422–75 of: Lepore and Smith 2006.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2007. Neutral relations revisited. Dialectica, 61, 25–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2011a. Impure reference: a way around the concept horse paradox. Philosophical Perpectives, 25, 297–312.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2011b. Relations and truthmaking II. Proceedings of the Aristotelain Society Supplementary Volume, 111, 161–79.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2014. How involved do you want to be in a non-symmetric relationship? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92, 1–16.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. 2018. On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Magidor, Ofra. 2009. The last dogma of type confusions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109, 1–29.Google Scholar
Martin, Michael. 1997. The reality of appearances. Pages 81–106 of: Sainsbury 1997.Google Scholar
Mates, Benson. 1972. Elementary Logic. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McDaniel, Kris. 2003. Against MaxCon Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 265–75.Google Scholar
McDaniel, Kris. 2007. Extended simples. Philosophical Studies, 133, 131–41.Google Scholar
McDaniel, Kris. 2009a. Extended simples and qualitative heterogeneity. The Philosophical Quarterly, 59, 325–31.Google Scholar
McDaniel, Kris. 2009b. Ways of being. Pages 290–319 of: Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman 2009.Google Scholar
McDaniel, Kris. 2017. The Fragmentation of Being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, John. 1977. On the sense and reference of a proper name. Mind, 86, 159–85.Google Scholar
McDowell, John. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, John. 2005. The true modesty of an identity conception of truth: a note in response to Pascal Engel (2001). International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 13, 83–8.Google Scholar
McGuinness, Brian (ed). 1980. Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
McGuinness, Brian (ed). 1984. Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
McKeon, Richard (ed). 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
McKinsey, Michael. 1999. The semantics of belief ascriptions. Noûs, 33, 519–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melia, Joseph. 2005. Truthmaking without truthmakers. Pages 67–84 of: Beebee and Dodd 2005.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mellor, David Hugh, and Oliver, Alex (eds). 1997. Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Mendelshon, Richard. 1981. Frege on predication. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 6, 69–82.Google Scholar
Merricks, Trenton. 2007. Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Merricks, Trenton. 2008. Replies to Cameron, Schaffer, and Soames. Philosophical Books, 49, 328–43.Google Scholar
Merricks, Trenton. 2015. Propositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Methven, Steven. 2018a. Ramsey, ‘universals’ and atomic propositions. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 27, 134–54.Google Scholar
Methven, Steven. 2018b. Sense and the identity conception of truth. European Journal of Philosophy, 26, 1041–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mill, John Stewart. 1843. A System of Logic, vol. I. London: Longmans.Google Scholar
Moltmann, Friederike. 2003. Propositional attitudes without propositions. Synthese, 135, 77–118.Google Scholar
Moltmann, Friederike. 2013. Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Languages. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Montague, Richard. 1973. The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English. In: Portner and Partee 2002.Google Scholar
Moore, Adrian. 1997. Points of View. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Moore, Adrian. 2003. Ineffability and nonsense (I). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 77, 169–93.Google Scholar
Moore, George Edward. 1901–2. Truth and falsity. Pages 20–2 of: Baldwin 1993.Google Scholar
Morris, Michael, and Dodd, Julian. 2007. Mysticism and nonsense in the Tractatus. European Journal of Philosophy, 17, 247–76.Google Scholar
Mulligan, Kevin, Simons, Peter, and Smith, Barry. 1984. Truth-makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 287–321.Google Scholar
Nebel, Jacob. 2019. Hopes, fears and other grammatical scarecrows. Philosophical Review, 128, 63–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Noonan, Harold. 2006. The concept horse. Pages 155–76 of: Strawson and Chackrabarti 2006.Google Scholar
Oliver, Alex. 1996. The metaphysics of properties. Mind, 105, 1–80.Google Scholar
Oliver, Alex. 2005. The Reference Principle. Analysis, 65, 177–87.Google Scholar
Oliver, Alex. 2010. What is a predicate? Pages 118–48 of: Potter and Ricketts 2010.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostertag, Gary (ed). 2016. Meanings and Other Things: Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Parsons, Josh. 1999. There is no ‘truthmaker’ argument against nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77, 325–34.Google Scholar
Parsons, Josh. 2004. Distributional properties. Pages 173–80 of: Jackson and Priest 2004.Google Scholar
Parsons, Terence. 1970. Criticism of ‘are predicates and relational expressions incomplete?’. The Philosophical Review, 79, 240–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parsons, Terence. 1986. Why Frege should not have said ‘the concept horse is not a concept’. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 3, 449–65.Google Scholar
Partee, Barbara. 1986. Noun phrase interpretation and type-shifting principles. Pages 357–81 of: Portner and Partee 2002.Google Scholar
Partee, Barbara, and Rooth, Mats. 1983. Generalised conjunction and type ambiguity. Pages 334–56 of: Portner and Partee 2002.Google Scholar
Paul, Laurie. 2002. Logical parts. Noûs, 36, 578–96.Google Scholar
Peacock, Howard. 2009. What’s wrong with ostrich nominalism? Philosophical Papers, 38, 183–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peacock, Howard. 2012. Bradley’s Regress, truthmaking and constitution. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 86, 1–21.Google Scholar
Portner, Paul, and Partee, Barbara (eds). 2002. Formal Semantics – The Essential Readings. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Potter, Michael. 2009. Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Potter, Michael, and Ricketts, Thomas (eds). 2010. The Cambridge Companion to Frege. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Price, Michael. 2016. Naming the concept horse. Philosophical Studies, 173, 2727– 43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Priest, Graham. 2014. One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, Including the Singular Object Which Is Nothingness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Prior, Arthur. 1963. Oratio obliqua (I). Proceedings of the Aristotelain Society Supplementary Volume, 37, 115–26.Google Scholar
Prior, Arthur. 1967. Correspondence theory of truth. Pages 223–32 of: Edwards 1967.Google Scholar
Prior, Arthur. 1971. Objects of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1939. Designation and existence. Journal of Philosophy, 36, 701–9.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1948. On what there is. Pages 1–19 of: Quine 1980a.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1951a. Semantics and abstract objects. Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 80, 90–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1951b. Two dogmas of empiricism. Pages 20–46 of: Quine 1980a.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1953a. Logic and the reification of universals. Pages 102–29 of: Quine 1980a.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1953b. Reference and modality. Pages 139–59 of: Quine 1980a.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1960. Word and Object. USA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1970. Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1980a. From a Logical Point of View. 2nd revised ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1980b. The variable and its place in reference. Pages 164–73 of: van Straaten 1980.Google Scholar
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. 1924. The foundations of mathematics. Pages 1–61 of: Braithwaite 1931.Google Scholar
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. 1925. Universals. Pages 112–34 of: Braithwaite 1931.Google Scholar
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. 1926. Universals and the ‘method of analysis’. Pages 135–7 of: Braithwaite 1931.Google Scholar
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. 1927. Facts and propositions. Pages 138–55 of: Braithwaite 1931.Google Scholar
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. 1991. On Truth. Episteme, no. 16. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
Raven, Michael. 2013. Is ground a strict partial order? American Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 193–201.Google Scholar
Rayo, Agustín. 2006. Beyond plurals. Pages 220–54 of: Rayo and Uzquiano 2006.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rayo, Agustín. 2013. The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rayo, Agustín, and Uzquiano, Gabriel. 1999. Toward a theory of second-order consequence. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 40, 315–25.Google Scholar
Rayo, Agustín, and Uzquiano, Gabriel. (eds). 2006. Absolute Generality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rayo, Agustín, and Yablo, Stephen. 2001. Nominalism through denominalization. Noûs, 35, 74–92.Google Scholar
Rescher, Nicholas (ed). 1968. Studies in Logical Theory. American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, vol. 2. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Rieppel, Michael. 2016. Being something: properties and predicative quantification. Mind, 125, 643–89.Google Scholar
Rieppel, Michael. 2018. Denoting and disquoting. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96, 548–61.Google Scholar
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2000. What is the problem of universals? Mind, 109, 255–74.Google Scholar
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2005. Why truthmakers. Pages 17–32 of: Beebee and Dodd 2005.Google Scholar
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2015. Grounding is not a strict order. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1, 517–34.Google Scholar
Rosefeldt, Tobias. 2008. ‘That’-clauses and non-nominal quantification. Philosophical Studies, 137, 301–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rumfitt, Ian. 2003. Singular terms and arithmetical logicism. Philosophical Books, 44, 193–219.Google Scholar
Rumfitt, Ian. 2014. Truth and Meaning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 88, 21–55.Google Scholar
Rumfitt, Ian. 2016. Objects of thought. Pages 73–94 of: Ostertag 2016.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 1903. The Principles of Mathematics. London: Allen and Unwin.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 1904. Meinong’s theory of complexes and assumptions III. Mind, 13, 509–24.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 1910a. On the nature of truth and falsehood. Pages 147–59 of: Russell 1910b.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 1910b. Philosophical Essays. London: Allen and Unwin.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 1913. Theory of Knowledge. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 7. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 1918. The philosophy of logical atomism. Pages 175–281 of: Russell 2007.Google Scholar
Russell, Bertrand. 2007. Logic and Knowledge. 2nd ed. Nottingham: Spokesman.Google Scholar
Russinoff, Susan. 1992. Frege and Dummett on the problem with the concept horse. Noûs, 26(1), 63–78.Google Scholar
Ryle, Gilbert. 1945–6. Knowing how and knowing that. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 46, 1–16.Google Scholar
Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. The Concept of Mind. Chicago: The Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Sainsbury, Mark (ed). 1997. Thought and Ontology. Milan: F. Angeli.Google Scholar
Sainsbury, Mark (ed). 2018. Thinking about Things. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009. On what grounds what. Pages 347–83 of: Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman 2009.Google Scholar
Schiffer, Stephen. 2003. The Things We Mean. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schirn, Matthias (ed). 1976. Studien zu Frege, vol. 3. Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog.Google Scholar
Schnieder, Benjamin. 2006. Truth-making without truth-makers. Synthese, 152, 21–46.Google Scholar
Seargent, David. 1985. Plurality and Continuity: An Essay in G.F. Stout’s Theory of Universals. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.Google Scholar
Sider, Theodore. 2006. ‘Bare Particulars’. Philosophical Perspectives, 20, 388–97.Google Scholar
Sider, Theodore. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Siegel, Susanna. 2010. The Contents Visual of Experience. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Simons, Peter. 1991. Ramsey, particulars, and universals. Theoria, 57, 150–61.Google Scholar
Soames, Scott. 2010. What Is Meaning? Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert. 1984. Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert. 1999. Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Stanley, Jason, and Williamson, Timothy. 2001. Knowing how. The Journal of Philosophy, 98, 411–44.Google Scholar
Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1950. Truth. Pages 190–213 of: Strawson 1971.Google Scholar
Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1959. Individuals. London: Methuen & Co.Google Scholar
Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1969. Meaning and truth. Pages 170–89 of: Strawson 1971.Google Scholar
Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1971. Logico-Linguistic Papers. London: Methuen & Co.Google Scholar
Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1974. Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar. London: Methuen & Co.Google Scholar
Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1987. Concepts and properties or predication and copulation. The Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 402–6.Google Scholar
Strawson, Peter Frederick, and Chakrabarti, Arindam (eds). 2006. Universals, Concepts and Qualities. Aldershot: Ashgate.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Peter. 1994. The sense of ‘a name of a truth-value’. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 476–81.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Peter. 1995. Wittgenstein on The Foundations of Mathematics, June 1927. Theoria, 61, 105–42.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Peter. 2002. On trying to be resolute: a response to Kremer on the Tractatus. European Journal of Philosophy, 10, 42–78.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Peter. 2003. Ineffability and nonsense (II). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 77, 195–223.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Peter. 2005. Identity theories of truth and the Tractatus. Philosophical Investigations, 28, 43–62.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Peter. 2010. Dummett’s Frege. Pages 86–117 of: Potter and Ricketts 2010.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Peter, and Potter, Michael (eds). 2013. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Tallant, Jonathan, and Ingram, David. 2017. Truth and dependence. Ergo, 4, 955–80.Google Scholar
Trueman, Robert. 2011. Propositional functions in extension. Theoria, 77, 292–311.Google Scholar
Trueman, Robert. 2013a. Neutralism within the semantic tradition. Thought, 1, 246–51.Google Scholar
Trueman, Robert. 2013b. Reducing truth through meaning. Erkenntnis, 78, 823–32.Google Scholar
Trueman, Robert. 2014. A dilemma for neo-Fregeanism. Philosophia Mathematica, 22, 361–79.Google Scholar
Trueman, Robert. 2015 . The concept horse with no name. Philosophical Studies, 172, 1889–906.Google Scholar
Trueman, Robert. 2018a. The prenective view of propositional content. Synthese, 195, 1799–825.Google Scholar
Trueman, Robert. 2018b. Substitution in a sense. Philosophical Studies, 175, 3069–98.Google Scholar
Trueman, Robert. In press. Idealism and the identity theory of truth. Mind.Google Scholar
Turner, Jason. 2010. Ontological pluralism. Journal of Philosophy, 107, 5–34.Google Scholar
Turner, Jason. 2012. Logic and ontological pluralism. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41, 419–48.Google Scholar
Tye, Michael. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Vallicella, William. 2000. Three conceptions of states of affairs. Noûs, 34, 237–59.Google Scholar
Vallicella, William. 2002. Relations, monism and the vindication of Bradley’s Regress. Dialectica, 56, 3–35.Google Scholar
van Cleve, James. 1994. Predication without universals? A fling with ostrich nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 577–90.Google Scholar
van Inwagen, Peter. 2004. A theory of properties. Pages 153–82 of: van Inwagen 2014.Google Scholar
van Inwagen, Peter. 2014. Existence: Essays in Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
van Straaten, Zak (ed). 1980. Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to PF Strawson. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Vogeleer, Svetlana, and Tasmowski, Liliane (eds). 2006. Non-definiteness and Plurality. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Whitehead, Alfred, and Russell, Bertrand. 1927. Principia Mathematica. 2nd ed., vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Whorf, Benjamin. 1956. Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings by Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Wiggins, David. 1984. The sense and reference of predicates: a running repair to Frege’s doctrine and a plea for the copula. The Philosophical Quarterly, 34(136), 311–28.Google Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 1985. Converse relations. The Philosophical Review, 94, 249–62.Google Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2003. Everything. Philosophical Perspectives, 17, 415–65.Google Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Winter, Yoad. 2007. Type-shifting with semantic features. Pages 164–87 of: Barker and Jacobson 2007.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul and Trubner.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. Philosophical Grammar. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. Philosophical Remarks. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Woods, Jack. 2018. Emptying a paradox of ground. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 47, 631–48.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Scots Philosophical Monographs, no. 2. Great Britain: Aberdeen University Press.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin. 1998. Why Frege does not deserve his grain of salt. Pages 72–90 of: Hale and Wright 2001.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin. 2007. On quantifying into predicate position: steps towards a new(tralist) perspective. Pages 150–74 of: Leng, Paseau et al. 2007.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×