Introduction

This chapter investigates the nature of the relations between the rules of professional associations and the shaping of community values in early Roman Egypt.

The ancient world was full of associations. From West to East, in urban as well as rural centres, individuals gathered in more or less formalised groups, each displaying specific purposes and connotations, and over time the associative model, or fenomeno associativo, was widespread across all of the Mediterranean countries – and beyond.Footnote ¹ Being part of a group reflected a primary human desire, thus providing individuals with a sense of belonging and contributing to the shaping of one’s social identity. Multiple reasons, social and cultural as well as political and economic, lie behind the development of this phenomenon.Footnote ² The religious element, in particular, was common to all types of ancient associations.Footnote ³ Some groups had a very distinctive religious character, as their main purpose revolved around the worship of a particular deity; in modern scholarship, these are generally referred to as ‘religious associations’.Footnote ⁴ Economy, broadly speaking, also played a role in the formation and evolution of associations; indeed, individuals sharing the same occupation are attested to have formed what today we usually call professional or trade associations.Footnote ⁵ The separation between religious and professional associations, however, was not definite and the boundaries between the two groups were rather blurred.Footnote ⁶ Religious elements were to be found in associations that had a prominent economic character and vice versa, as we shall see later in this chapter.

Associations with a more pronounced professional (or economic) focus grew in number during the early Roman period.Footnote ⁷ The evidence shows that such groups normally had a well-defined internal structure and sets of regulations, nomoi, which governed individual behaviour as well as communal activities. From Roman Egypt three sets of regulations have survived, all coming from the same village, Tebtynis, in the Fayum (ancient Arsinoite district), and dated to the mid-first century AD: of a non-identified association; of the apolysimoi of the imperial estate of Claudius, that is, imperial farmers who were exempt from certain liturgies; and of the salt merchants (halopolai).Footnote ⁸ The three nomoi were formally recorded at the local record office (grapheion), which reflected a common practice among associations; indeed, the contemporary register of contract titles attests the registration of several nomoi for the year AD 45/6 (see discussion below).Footnote ⁹

Thanks to the availability of a significant number of contemporary documents from the same site, we are also well informed about the social, economic and administrative environment in which these associations operated and their rules functioned.Footnote ¹⁰ This gives us a unique opportunity to explore the issues that are put forward in this volume: the place of association rules in the local community and their role in producing and shaping social values.

The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to identify the values embedded in the regulations of the professional associations of early Roman Egypt and establish how far these values reflected those of the local community; second, to determine whether these rules aimed to create a well-ordered society (and whether they succeeded in doing so).

Regulations of Associations in Roman Egypt

In Egypt, associations had a long-standing tradition, which can be traced back to the Saite period.Footnote ¹¹ As mentioned in the introduction, in the Roman period there was a proliferation of associations with a more professional characterisation, and it is remarkable to note that in Egypt many of these groups operated in rural communities. In the first century AD in the village of Tebtynis only there were at least eighteen associations that displayed a professional character; they exhibited a high level of specialisation and professionalism, mainly to do with textile production (weavers, dyers, fullers, cloak-makers, cloak-beaters and wool merchants) and metal work (coppersmiths and goldsmiths).Footnote ¹² The role and importance of these groups have not gone unnoticed. Recent studies have focussed in particular on their economic dimension, suggesting that membership in a formalised group provided protection and clear financial advantages.Footnote ¹³ In this period, associations were private and voluntary enterprises, which means that there was no formal imposition on individuals to band together.Footnote ¹⁴ Nevertheless, a large proportion of the population participated in associations, and this was not a phenomenon limited to Egypt. Usually these groups were headed by a president, who was elected by the majority of the members and was in charge of enforcing the rules.Footnote ¹⁵ However, some particularly large associations, like the public farmers (demosioi georgoi) and the fishermen (halieis), had a board of officials called elders (presbyteroi), as the management of their activities would have been more demanding and in this way duties could be shared.Footnote ¹⁶ In the daily administration they were assisted by a secretary (grammateus).Footnote ¹⁷

In the Roman period Egyptian associations had sets of rules which were agreed upon by the majority of the members and formally registered at the record office, as confirmed by the case of mid-first-century Tebtynis.Footnote ¹⁸ As notarial agreements (demosioi chrematismoi), these documents were legally binding. This means that members of an association committed to the compliance of the rules from a private as well as legal perspective; in other words, violation of rules could result in formal legal action, should the association deem it necessary, even though internal resolution of disputes seems to have been the preferred method for members (see below).Footnote ¹⁹

Boak was the first to note that the procedure by which associations’ rules were validated voluntarily by their members was to be found in the Athenian private associations before Alexander the Great and suggested that their ‘contractual basis was introduced into Egypt under Greek influence’.Footnote ²⁰ The traditional view holds that the nomoi had a one-year validity.Footnote ²¹ While this seems to have been the norm in the Ptolemaic period, this was definitely not the case under the Romans.Footnote ²² As I suggested elsewhere, the president was in charge for one year, whereas the rules had a variable validity, which could be longer than one year.Footnote ²³ The role of the president, with his power to enforce the association rules and collect fees and fines, was not necessarily or exclusively one of social prestige, but could also be a burden. Normally, presidents had other occupations to keep them busy; an example is given by Petheus son of Petheus, president and secretary of the weavers of Kerkesoucha Orous.Footnote ²⁴ His daily schedule must have been quite hectic: as a weaver, he was engaged in textile production; as a president and secretary of an association, he had to perform regular administrative and other social tasks. Although in the ancient world occupational patterns were normally rather fluid, the involvement in different roles and activities of varying degrees of responsibility must have been demanding; therefore, the temporary nature of an association president’s mandate would have made this role more attractive. It is likely that the annual turnover of presidents also contributed to ensuring that a certain level of fairness was kept in the internal set-up of the group and in the management of the various activities. In this way, no one would have been given the chance to establish and foster long-term power relations.

The rules, on the other hand, did not need to be modified every year; the president was in charge of their enforcement, and in the case of violation he had the authority to arrest the defaulter (enechyrazein) and ‛hand him over’ (paradidonai), most likely to the local authorities.Footnote ²⁵ The main purpose of these regulations was to create a social and administrative order within whose boundaries individuals could operate and interact with each other; this also created what we might call a ‘sub-legal’ system within the established judicial system.Footnote ²⁶ Although associations, in the role of their president, had the right to enforce their rules, there is no evidence suggesting that they had their own judicial system. Instead, it appears that members tended to favour, when possible, internal resolution of disputes, as recently noted by Cameron Hawkins and Philip Venticinque.Footnote ²⁷ The fact that nomoi were registered at the record office means that the central government was informed of the associations’ affairs, but also, and most importantly, that the associations were making a conscious effort to align themselves and their rules with the state’s practice of registration.Footnote ²⁸ In general, this attitude of conforming to the values of the central power was typical of associations in the Roman East.Footnote ²⁹

For the Ptolemaic period, we have several rules of religious associations in Demotic from Tebtynis.Footnote ³⁰ Using the network model theorised by Charles Tilly, Andrew Monson interpreted the ethical rules of these groups as a vehicle to create an institutionalised trust network that would facilitate cooperation between members.Footnote ³¹ In his view, economic reasons were secondary to social relations when joining an association. Was this still true in the Roman period? Did rules of associations and their underlying values change over time, adapting to new socio-economic and political circumstances? And finally, can the network model still be applied to the so-called professional associations of the Roman period? The following sections will attempt to answer these questions.

The Evidence

The village of Tebtynis provides us with particularly valuable evidence about rules of associations: three full sets of regulations and a notarial register dated to AD 45/6 in which at least six other associations recorded their rules. Of these, the title of only two is given: of the shepherds (poimenes) and of the builders (oikodomoi).Footnote ³² The surviving three sets of rules regulated three separate types of associations, each reflecting a specific dimension of the local community; some of the rules are in common, some others are unique to each group. All three ordinances include a provision regarding the election of an annual president who was given the power to enforce the laws of the association, a provision on the attendance of monthly banquets and a number of provisions on the prosecution of lawbreakers, which varied from one group to another (Table 8.1).Footnote ³³ They also include a number of ethical rules, which regulated the social relations between the members and set the correct line of conduct. These constituted a well-ingrained tradition in Egyptian associations, and their presence in the ordinances of the Roman period attests to a line of continuity in the life of these groups.Footnote ³⁴ The rules of an ethical nature are prominent in the ordinance of the non-identified association. The nomos of this group exhibits an essentially convivial character. Their explicit purpose was to hold monthly banquets to which all members had to contribute through the payment of dues. According to Boak, the reference to the purchase of a flock of sheep as an event to be celebrated might suggest the possibility that we are dealing here with the association of the cattle graziers (probatoktenotrophoi). However, this is not a convincing argument. In this document it is clear that the purchase of a flock has the same value as the purchase of a property (to eggaion), and in the same provision other events are envisaged as occasions for celebration. It is possible that members of this group engaged in some type of collective activity (economic or administrative) and that their rules, though not directly regulating this particular aspect of communal life, facilitated these non-convivial operations.

That conviviality was the main feature of this association is also suggested by the number of provisions on social gatherings and ethical behaviour, mutual support and respect, which are not to be found in the other two extant nomoi. Members were required to follow a good conduct and to make a financial contribution when another member married, had a child and bought a property, cattle or a flock of sheep; members were also expected to help a fellow member in trouble and to be considerate when taking seats at a banquet, and were forbidden to prosecute and to corrupt a fellow member. Finally, a provision was included regulating behaviour in the event of a member’s death, whereby members had to shave, feast for one day and contribute with 1 drachma and two loaves of bread each. The importance of these ethical rules is reflected in their respective fines, which ranged from a minimum of 3 obols for shoving other members at the banquets, to 8 drachmas for denying help to a fellow member, for prosecuting him or slandering him, to a maximum of 60 drachmas for intriguing against a member or corrupting his home. It emerges clearly that fines were directly proportional to the seriousness of the violation, thus revealing the values that the group perceived as of the utmost importance and that therefore should not be infringed. For this association, it was the act of scheming against another member (hyponomeuein) or corrupting his home (oikophthoreuein) that was viewed as the most appalling offence of all, with a fine of 60 drachmas. By ensuring good conduct and mutual respect, ethical rules encouraged the creation and maintenance of strong relations of trust and solidarity. The inclusion in the nomos of such rules (and associated fines) combined with a monthly fee of 12 drachmas per member and occasional additional contributions made membership of this group rather costly. As Philip Venticinque has noted, an annual membership of 144 drachmas would have been sufficient to support a family of four for a year, thus suggesting that members were relatively well off.Footnote ³⁵ The enforcement of fines that added to the members’ financial burden no doubt would have been a good way to ensure proper behaviour.

In the nomos of the apolysimoi and in that of the salt merchants, rules on social behaviour are limited to provisions on mutual support in case of debt and attendance of funerals for the former and to participation of meetings only for the latter. An early provision states the main purpose for the apolysimoi, that is, to pay their share of the poll-tax (laographia) and other expenses (dapanai) to their president.Footnote ³⁶ This rule is of particular significance, for two reasons: first, because it highlights the administrative and practical aspect of their gathering into a formalised group; second, because it reveals that members of this group were not exempt from the main capitation tax, but from liturgies.Footnote ³⁷ Paying taxes as a collective was not without advantages, mainly because it avoided that members must deal directly with tax collectors.Footnote ³⁸ Another noteworthy aspect of their regulations is the formalised link with the emperor Claudius; a provision required that members hold a party on the eighth day of each month, in honour of the emperor’s birthday, with the president providing drinks for the celebrations and toasts. No provision is to be found that regulated other collective activities of the group, but some entries listed in the contemporary register of contract titles suggest that the apolysimoi occasionally made contracts as a collective. One contract, for example, mentions the ‛group of apolysimoi’ (plethos apolysimon).Footnote ³⁹ A group of apolysimoi is also attested, jointly with the cattle graziers, in two affidavits (cheirographiai) registered at the record office in AD 45/6.Footnote ⁴⁰ It is unclear whether these apolysimoi are to be identified with the apolysimoi of the estate of Claudius or with the farmers of another estate, but it is interesting to note that the two associations had shared interests (perhaps leasing of pasture land) and engaged in collective actions (one of the affidavits mentions the maintenance of some canals). The association of the apolysimoi with an imperial estate and their potential collaboration with groups of professional cattle breeders suggest that their activities included farming and livestock grazing. It is not surprising that these activities were not officially regulated by a nomos, as they were in fact ‘state’ activities, whose main terms were dictated by the Roman government and therefore there was no need, or freedom, for enforcing specific rules. However, the fact that the imperial farmers made contracts as a collective guaranteed some degree of flexibility in their economic enterprises. The rules of their associations did not give instructions as to how make bid applications or any other type of contracts, but facilitated these transactions by introducing a provision on debt, whereby members were given security for a set period of time (thirty or sixty days) in case they incurred in a private debt of up to 100 drachmas. Membership itself served as a protective measure in financial dealings.

A provision on debt is missing in the nomos of the salt merchants, but nine out of twelve regulations deal with the arrangement for the distribution of salt and gypsum among the members in the Fayum region. The reason behind the lack of a clause on debt probably lies in the fact that the salt merchants already enjoyed rights and privileges that other traders did not have, which was reflected in the careful subdivision of areas among the members. The sale of salt, at least in the Fayum, constituted a government concession, and salt merchants were required to submit bidding applications (anaphoria) to the state in order to acquire this right, as is attested by the local record office evidence dated to AD 45/6.Footnote ⁴¹ Membership in an association aimed at strengthening the position of the salt merchants in the various activities connected with their trade, from the application process to the sale of the finished product.Footnote ⁴² For the association to work efficiently, precise rules were needed as how to divide the market among the members.Footnote ⁴³ This was all the more important due to the presence in the area of other groups of the same type, namely, the salt merchants of Talei and Theogonis and those of Ibion Eikosipentarouron.Footnote ⁴⁴ The inclusion of legally binding rules on the subdivision of localities for the sale of salt must be seen as a way to regulate the competition and to set defined and clear parameters by which each member was required to abide. Needless to say, failure to do so resulted in the payment of fees, which was probably a good deterrent for misbehaving members.

While the expectation in all three sets of rules that members attended monthly meetings is a good indication of the strong social character of these groups, some associations felt the need to add rules that regulated more closely the ethical behaviour of their members. The exact nature of each of these associations is difficult to ascertain. If we go by the content of their nomoi and their titles, we may conclude that the non-identified association was a convivial club, while the apolysimoi and the salt merchants constituted more professional groups. This distinction, however, is not a fair reflection of the realities behind these groups. As Vincent Gabrielsen pointed out, associations that did not display in their title an occupational connotation did not necessarily lack an economic role in the community and, therefore, should not be excluded from our economic analysis.Footnote ⁴⁵

The regulations of the exempt farmers of the imperial estate of Claudius and those of the salt merchants reveal two fundamental dimensions of communal life in the early Roman period: first, the desire to fit into the new Roman administrative system, which is clearly shown by the formalised commitment of the apolysimoi to pay taxes collectively; second, the social values of conviviality and sociability, which are the reflection of a society where personal relations were central, and trust among individuals was continuously fostered.

A significant aspect of communal life that emerges from the three sets of regulations is geographical mobility. Members of associations regularly travelled from their village of residence to other villages of the region and to the district capital, Ptolemais Euergetis, in order to attend monthly meetings in the context of which social networks were established and maintained. Reasons to travel outside Tebtynis were either business or participation in religious festivals and other social events; the salt merchants, for example, who held the concession for the sale of salt and gypsum in Tebtynis and nearby villages, were expected to travel around the district and have business relations with merchants and other buyers living outside Tebtynis. Provisions on meetings in the nomoi clearly attest this type of mobility. Members of the three associations were required to attend all the meetings called by the president, which could take place in the village, in a place outside the village or in the district capital. Although the nature of these meetings is not specified, variation in fines for failing to attend them suggests that their importance depended on their location, and those happening in the district capital were of particular significance: between 1 and 2 drachmas if the meeting was in the village, 4 drachmas if it was outside the village, 4 and 8 drachmas if it was in the district capital.Footnote ⁴⁶ It appears that the non-identified association was less mobile; its members did not have meetings in other villages and the fine for missing a meeting in Ptolemais Euergetis was lower (4 instead of 8 drachmas). We do not know how far members of other associations established social or economic relations with individuals in other villages and in the district capital, but the very fact that some of their meetings took place outside Tebtynis, where the association was based, unveils the existence of a net of connections between Tebtynis, its neighbouring villages and Ptolemais Euergetis. It is most likely that one of the purposes of their meetings and banquets was that of providing the members with the possibility of networking, which would have facilitated potential economic dealings by creating trust networks.

An important fact to be noted is the inclusion of ethical rules in the ordinance of the non-identified association, which are missing in the other two ordinances (the exempt farmers of the imperial estate of Claudius do have provisions for mutual assistance and funerals, but none on ethical behaviour). Does this mean that these values were less important for the purpose of being a member of a professional association? Did the salt merchants not value the contribution of ethical rules? As membership in an association was not mutually exclusive, it is possible that those who were part of a more professional association also joined a social club, like that of the non-identified association, in order to enjoy the privileges of mutual support. Certain rules were agreed upon by the members on the basis of their particular needs, which clearly differed from one group to another. The relations between members of a professional association seem to have relied on rules that were dictated by conscious economic decisions more than on social rules, suggesting that the members were aware that this group was in fact an economic enterprise.

Table 8.1 includes a list of provisions to be found in the three surviving sets of regulations (of the non-identified association, of the apolysimoi and of the salt merchants), thus revealing which terms were common to all, which were common to two associations only and, finally, which terms were unique to one association only. It emerges clearly that, although associations were free to devise their personalised sets of rules according to their own needs, they all shared three core provisions – election of a president, obligation to attend monthly banquets and prosecution of lawbreakers – which can be regarded as the distinctive markers of an officially recognised association, at least in the Roman period.

The World of Professional Associations: A Well-Ordered Society?

The regulations of associations that survived from early Roman Egypt reveals the existence of a set of social values that underpinned the behaviour and activities of these groups and the relations between their members. These values were of two types: ethical (solidarity, trust and sociability) and practical (mobility and desire to integrate into the Roman administrative and economic framework). The fact that a large number of people joined one or more of these associations confirms that these values were not unique to specific groups but reflected those of the entire community. Although the percentage of individuals who were members of specific formalised groups cannot be calculated, the evidence from Tebtynis gives us a pretty good idea of the magnitude of this phenomenon. Assuming that each association had an average of twenty to thirty members, I calculated elsewhere that 10 to 15 per cent of the male population in the village might have belonged to an association.Footnote ⁴⁷

Trust and solidarity were not simply theoretical notions, but core values at the base of the contractual economy of Roman Egypt. Mobility too was not a prerogative of members of associations, but a phenomenon widely attested among all strata of the population. Traders and craftsmen, for example, were not the only social groups who travelled around their own region and beyond. Shepherds too, who, incidentally, might have formed an association, occasionally had to relocate their flocks to different areas (sometimes outside their own district) to find pastures; state officials, slaves and freedmen who worked in administrative roles regularly travelled on business, and many individuals of Hellenic descent resided half-time in the district capital, half-time in the village, therefore making frequent journeys between their two residences.Footnote ⁴⁸

The increase of professional associations under the Romans was not a product of chance, but a phenomenon strictly connected with the proliferation of state concessions, which in many cases replaced the old Ptolemaic monopolies.Footnote ⁴⁹ This new situation led to the development of ad hoc rules that reflected the new needs of these groups’ members. The case of the salt merchants in this respect is illustrative, as it shows the necessity to regulate a specific economic activity – the distribution of salt and gypsum – within a wide region and was not a unique case. As the evidence from first-century Tebtynis shows, many economic enterprises were now organised as state concessions and revolved around a relevant association: the fishermen, the builders, the weavers, the dyers, the cattle graziers and so on.Footnote ⁵⁰

The nomoi of these groups have not come down to us, but the example of the salt merchants suggests that some of their rules also covered their economic dimension. Such associations most likely had regulations that covered the financial aspects of their business; the weavers, for example, paid their trade tax (cheironaxion) collectively, a condition that was probably included in their nomos.

The values introduced by the new rules reflected primarily the need of the individuals to acquire enhanced support and protection in the bidding procedure.Footnote ⁵¹ The old social and ethical rules, conversely, were not abandoned, as they were strongly embedded in institutionalised social networks.

In this respect, the nomoi of the Roman period associations reflect a community that was different from the one in place in the Ptolemaic period. This society had new needs and concerns; the livelihood of families and individuals depended now on an economic set-up mainly based on an organised system of licence fees that required initiative and resourcefulness on the part of the bidders. State concessions enhanced competition and gave individuals the possibility to be involved actively and voluntarily in a number of activities. It was a chance for more profit, but it also meant financial risk. The associative model, based on those ethical values that had characterised the Egyptian society for a long time, proved to be a useful way to deal with this new scenario.

The economic situation in Egypt rapidly changed from the first to the second century AD.Footnote ⁵² Associations were put under stricter control and soon were required to perform administrative duties on behalf of the state.Footnote ⁵³ The change in the administrative and economic set-up would have led inevitably to a change in community values – in many cases, fear was probably more prominent than desire for profit, and ethical and protectionist norms might have had a privileged place in associations’ nomoi. The character of associations and their rules adapted to the increasingly and ever-changing society, demonstrating not only that they were a fundamental social institution, but also that they were flexible and easily adjustable to different situations. Some rules, however, did not disappear, for example, the ones related to burial of members and members’ relatives.Footnote ⁵⁴ While various political and economic contingencies gradually modified the ancient Egyptian society, community values that mirrored the new needs of the individuals (to conform to the Roman administration) emerged. This was an attempt on the part of associations to align their values (and those of their own community) with the values of the central authority. Things, of course, did not always run smoothly. Conflicts and disagreements can be seen in petitions in which members of associations filed complaints in matters of taxation, an inevitable result considering that by the second century AD associations became fully involved in the administrative state machinery.Footnote ⁵⁵

The creation of ad hoc rules that would conform to new circumstances confirms the willingness of associations to survive and maintain a certain order in which they could exist. From this point of view, it could be argued that rules were established to create a well-ordered society; whether members of associations were influenced or inspired by the Greek idea of ‘good order’, is, however, difficult to prove. Though deeply ingrained in the native Egyptian strata of the population, associations had a long tradition that combined both Egyptian and Greek models; ‘good order’ might have been embedded in the Greek model, but there is no clear evidence. More likely, the reason why associations, with their rules, strove to achieve a social order lies in their need for preservation. The associative model provided a useful social (and, to an extent, economic) framework that their members did not want to give up. They created rules that allowed their associations to function the best way possible under different political, administrative and economic scenarios.

It is very tempting to suggest that the values that were at the core of professional associations in the early Roman period and beyond, that is, trust, solidarity and mutual support, had a universal character. These were to be found in Egypt well before Christianity and continued to be an integral part of the identity and rules of associations in later periods and in different regions outside Egypt.Footnote ⁵⁶ In her analysis of medieval craft guilds and market order in the sixteenth century, Mougeot points out that ‘although they conveyed the values required to set up an economy of exchange, these craft guilds remained influenced by the values of mutual assistance which was a feature of primitive society’.Footnote ⁵⁷ Their rules of conduct, which regulated ethical behaviour to ensure good business, were approved by the legal authorities. Admittedly, late antique and medieval associations were different from earlier institutionalised groups. However, members still found a way to preserve the ethical values that were at the core of their own establishment.Footnote ⁵⁸