The main focus of this book has been on the intersection of some topics surprisingly scantily represented in the standard moral philosophy literature: the social and cognitive psychology of human judgment, social freedom, and the general structure of moral judgment in private life. Inquiry in any one of these areas provides counterpoints to some widely accepted principles of moral theory. Their combination suggests that the way philosophers have framed issues for theoretical discussion may obscure rather than clarify some key pieces of the moral picture.

In exploring a role for privacy in the social context, we have come to see it as a means of regulating the amount of social control afforded individuals within associations, both public and private. Trying to understand why both individuals and associations need a social control mechanism like privacy, we came to realize some important truths about both individuals and groups.

About individuals we realized that the sort of independence, cognitive and motivational, that is presupposed in much moral theorizing is radically misguided. The prospect and the desirability of people's coming to a moral stance independent of cultural influence were called into question. The prospect and the desirability of people's forming judgments without reference to what those around them think about the issues and without reference to what others would think about those people were they to disregard the influence of those others came to seem not the humanizing and liberating force so often represented in abstract moral theorizing.