Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-t5pn6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T10:18:17.895Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

10 - Are You Better Off Now Than You Were 12,000 Years Ago? An Empirical Assessment of the Hobbesian Hypothesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 April 2017

Karl Widerquist
Affiliation:
Georgetown University
Grant S. McCall
Affiliation:
Tulane University
Get access

Summary

With the violence hypothesis strongly refuted by Chapter 9, an argument for the Hobbesian hypothesis needs to discuss overall welfare, as Locke did in the seventeenth century. But assessing overall welfare is much more difficult than assessing whether people are under the constant fear of violent death. Contractarians and propertarians need to show that everyone in one situation is better off than they could reasonably expect to be in another situation. Yet, none of the contractarian and propertarian literature reviewed in Chapters 3–7 provides significant evidence for it or even suggests any rigorous methodology to examine the question. Most of this literature is satisfied to imply that the Hobbesian hypothesis is somehow obvious. We are unable to provide a rigorous methodology for contractarians, and so we use an ad hoc comparison of whether people seem to be better off in several important ways that they have good reason to care about.

Hobbes's (1962 [1651]: 100) famous phrase, “the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,” helpfully identifies four broad categories of wellbeing. Nasty and brutish are synonymous for violence, which was addressed by Chapter 9. That leaves three other categories: solitary (social and cultural satisfaction), poor (material wellbeing), and short (health and longevity). The first part of this chapter addresses these three categories in turn, and the following sections address two others. The end of this chapter discusses the issue of freedom, which is particularly important to propertarianism. We also offer a discussion of observed choice, which is the most direct evidence of consent, the ultimate category for contractarianism.

This chapter concludes with an overall assessment, and the results are tragic. In all or most of the five categories, it is reasonable to say that the average person is better off in most contemporary state societies (although not in most past state societies). But contemporary states allow so much inequality—with a bottom so low in absolute terms—that significant numbers of people are worse off in capitalist state societies than they would be even in a small-scale stateless society.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×