Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-rvbq7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-09T01:32:12.463Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Comment

from 8 - Why capital controls? Theory and evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2013

Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Affiliation:
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, The Netherlands
Harry P. Huizinga
Affiliation:
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, The Netherlands
Get access

Summary

This is a nice chapter for at least two reasons. First, it combines theory with empirical results. Second, it uses an eclectic approach, i.e. it does not rely on a single, often narrow, theory to explain the world but rather draws on a number of theories.

Theory

Of course, the chapter also has its weaknesses. Let me start with the theoretical section, which is actually very similar to that in Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994). It would be nice if the introduction made it clear how this contribution differs from previous papers by the author and made it clearer what the specific contribution of this particular chapter is. In this connection, the existing literature on the political economy of capital controls should be referred to, for example, an article by Epstein and Schor (1992).

The theory section describes a number of arguments in favor of capital controls. For an IMF official, this is not easy to accept because the IMF tends to promote free international capital flows and thus typically argues in favor of removing these controls. Indeed, the theoretical section does reflect some tension between, on the one hand, providing arguments in favor of such controls, and, on the other hand, counseling against capital controls by pointing out that capital controls tend to be counter-productive. If countries believed this counsel, they would almost never use them.

Type
Chapter
Information
Positive Political Economy
Theory and Evidence
, pp. 248 - 252
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×