In the final part of this book I intend to put my conclusions into perspective by comparing them with those reached by historians doing similar work on other countries and with more abstract theories devised by political scientists studying relations between capitalism and the state.

The Belgian example

It might be expected that the experience of French business would be most closely mirrored in Belgium. Belgium bordered on one of the most industrialized area of France, the Nord and Pas-de-Calais, and the economies of the two areas, dominated by coal-mining and iron production, were similar. Furthermore, Belgian industrialists, like their French counterparts, had to deal with democratic government, until 1940, and thereafter with defeat, invasion and occupation. Indeed, after 1940, Belgium and the Nord and Pas-de-Calais were subject to the same German authority based in Brussels.

Yet the political reactions of industrialists in France and Belgium could not have been more different. Industrialists in Belgium worked closely with the country's political elites in order to negotiate with the occupying authorities. This co-operation was illustrated by the Galopin committee that brought together businessmen and administrators during the occupation.1 French industrialists, on the other hand, felt sharply alienated from the Vichy government (see chapter 8).

There are three reasons for the different reaction of French and Belgian industrialists to defeat and occupation. Firstly, the invasion of Belgium, unlike that of France, was not a ‘strange defeat’. This had given the ruling elite time to prepare and co-ordinate their strategy.