Should egalitarian justice be qualified by an agent-relative prerogative to act on a preference for—and thereby in a manner that gives rise to or preserves a greater than equal share of the goods of life for—oneself, one's family, loved ones, or friends as compared with strangers? Although many would reply that the answer to this question must be ‘yes’, I shall argue here that the case for such a prerogative to depart from equality is much less far-reaching than one might think. I have in mind a prerogative to depart from a specific form of equality: namely, equality of opportunity for such advantages as resources or welfare. I mean to refer to the strong form of equal opportunity elaborated and defended by Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen whereby, roughly speaking, two people have equal opportunity for advantage if they face the same choices and will end up at the same level of advantage if they make the same choices.

In order to maintain clear focus on the question I have just posed, I shall assume in the remarks that follow that equality is fully compatible with the leading of a decent life. Prerogatives to raise oneself or one's loved ones beyond equality might seem compelling when equality is inconsistent with having enough in absolute terms to lead a decent life. But this is to say that one might have a prerogative to escape from or protect oneself against insufficiency—and also, I should add, a prerogative to escape the full demands of act-utilitarianism when one would have to sacrifice a decent life in order to maximize utility.