Sklar's paper in this volume will inevitably provoke the criticism that his conception of democracy is ethnocentric. For more than a decade, indeed, Third World scholars have been lambasting their counterparts in Western Europe and North America for ‘ethnocentrism’ and ‘cultural imperialism’, and usually the charge has been accepted quite meekly. I shall argue, however, that not only is the criticism rather stale, but it has in fact always been question-begging and shallow. Further, if we look closely at the premises implicit in the criticism, they often reveal a double standard: a denunciation of the intellectual nationalism of others and an exaltation of intellectual nationalism (indeed, protectionism) nearer to home, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Lastly, the criticism itself, set against the variety of Western writings on (in this case) Africa, is indiscriminate, in specifics unfair and inaccurate, and in methodology confused.

This argument does not mean that any critique of ethnocentrism is groundless or that the term itself is without meaning. Nor does it imply that the indignation of Third World scholars is always unjustified or exaggerated. Indeed, it is only necessary to read quickly through Sklar's chapter to experience again the irritants which have so inflamed African nationalists. The very clarity and self-confidence of the paper illuminate the features of American liberal evangelism that both attract and repel. On the one hand, they highlight its robustly egalitarian approach to the world and its expansive, energetic involvement in international affairs. On the other hand, these features make for a no doubt unintended sense of indifference to the cultural and intellectual claims of nationalism, as well as a sense of telling others what is good for them.