Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 The theory of forms
- Chapter 2 The theory criticized
- Chapter 3 The theory modified: methodology
- Chapter 4 The First Deduction
- Chapter 5 The Second Deduction
- Chapter 6 From the Appendix to the Fourth Deduction
- Chapter 7 From the Fifth to the Eighth Deduction
- Conclusion
- References
- Index of forms discussed
- Index of Deductions
- Index of passages cited
- General index
Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 The theory of forms
- Chapter 2 The theory criticized
- Chapter 3 The theory modified: methodology
- Chapter 4 The First Deduction
- Chapter 5 The Second Deduction
- Chapter 6 From the Appendix to the Fourth Deduction
- Chapter 7 From the Fifth to the Eighth Deduction
- Conclusion
- References
- Index of forms discussed
- Index of Deductions
- Index of passages cited
- General index
Summary
The fundamental lesson of the Parmenides, I claim, is that RP, P, NCC, and U should be excised from the higher theory of forms. But, as developmentalists agree, the Parmenides is succeeded by (at least) five dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, and Laws. Do any of these dialogues contain evidence that supports the interpretive conclusion for which I have argued?
Even in the absence of a complete interpretation of Plato's late dialogues, I believe that this question may be answered affirmatively. If my interpretation of the Parmenides is largely accurate, then, as I argue below, we can explain (ⅰ) why P, RP, and NCC are abandoned in the Sophist, and why RP is abandoned in the Philebus, (ⅱ) why the epistemological investigation in the Theaetetus takes the surprising form it does, and (ⅲ) why there is a methodological turn towards division and collection in the late dialogues, particularly in the Sophist and Statesman.
It is also worth asking what remains of the higher theory once all offending principles have been abandoned. The answer, as we will see, is that while the substance of the theory and the method of dialectical investigation have changed, the arguments of the Parmenides have not forced Plato to abandon the forms altogether. The forms remain, but they are no longer the “perfect, and simple, and unshakeable, and blissful” objects in a place “beyond heaven” (Phaedrus 250c2–3, 247c3).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Plato's Forms in TransitionA Reading of the Parmenides, pp. 240 - 250Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006