At the end of his long speech on the Delphic oracle, Critias offered ­self-knowledge as an account of σωϕροσύνη. Socrates’ subsequent ­questioning led to the development of two distinct formulations of that account, which I have labeled “Critian” and “Socratic.” Socrates then announced a new beginning and set forth a two-part program of investigation: first, assessing the possibility of σωϕροσύνη conceived as ­self-knowledge; ­second, assuming that self-knowledge is possible, determining its usefulness. At the start of the possibility discussion, Socrates turns his attention specifically to the Critian formulation (167b10–c1). He begins with a confession of his own ἀπορία and with the expression of his hope that Critias will prove to be “more resourceful” (εὐπορώτερος) than he is in this matter (167b7–9). The discussion of the Critian ­formulation ends with Critias’ “catching” his ἀπορία, as one person’s yawning may set off another’s. At that point Socrates turns to consider the possibility of σωϕροσύνη as self-knowledge under the Socratic formulation. In this chapter, we are concerned with the discussion of σωϕροσύνη under the Critian formulation.

The Critian formulation, as Socrates restates it at the beginning of this section, is as follows: