Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-c4f8m Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T10:14:11.898Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - Forging a New Environmental and Resource Economics Paradigm

The Contractual Bases for Exchange

from Part I - Perspectives on Theories of Intellectual Property

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2011

F. Scott Kieff
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Get access

Summary

A survey of the environmental and natural resource economics literature finds few references to property rights and transaction costs. The Journal of Economic Literature, for example, has no recent articles on natural resources or the environment containing the phrase “transaction costs,” “property rights,” or “Coase” in the title or abstract. When the search of the journal was expanded to these words appearing anywhere in the article, only one paper was found and it was about resource management without markets.

The environmental and natural resource literature instead focuses on problems of market failure in the tradition of A. C. Pigou. Accordingly, natural resources and environmental goods are either overexploited as a result of the tragedy of the commons – for example, fisheries – or underproduced as a result of the free-rider problem – for example, species habitat. In either case, market failure is the issue and governmental intervention is warranted.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Brown, Gardner M.Renewable Natural Resource Management and Use without Markets 38 2000
1920
1987
Ackerman, Bruce A.Hassler, W.T. 1981
Pashigian, B. PeterEnvironmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected? 23 1985
1997
Richards, Bill 1992
Kanamine, Linda 1993
Rosato, Donna 1993
Blumm, Michael C.Schwartz, TheaMono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water 37 1995
Coase, RonaldThe Problem of Social Cost 3 1960
Bromley, Daniel W. 1987
Yandle, Bruce 1998
Cheung, StevenThe Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource 13 1970
Dahlman, CarlThe Problem of Externality 22 1979
Demsetz, Harold 2003
Williamson, Oliver 1999
Randall, Alan 1993
Tullock, GordonThe Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft 5 1967
Demsetz, HaroldWhen Does the Rule of Liability Matter? 1 1972
Demsetz, HaroldToward a Theory of Property Rights 57 1967
Anderson, Terry L.Hill, Peter J.The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West 18 1975
Anderson, Terry L.Hill, Peter J. 2004
Anderson, Terry L.McChesney, Fred S.Raid or Trade: An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations 37 1994
Libecap, Gary D.Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights 38 1976
Umbeck, JohnA Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush 20 1977
Umbeck, JohnThe California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights 14 1977
Zerbe, Jr Richard O.Anderson, C. LeighCulture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in the California Gold Fields 61 2001
Anderson, Terry L.Hill, Peter J.The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West 18 1975
Anderson & HillPrivatizing the Commons: An Improvement 50 1983
Anderson & HillThe Race for Property Rights 33 1990
Libecap, Gary D.Johnson, Ronald N.Property Rights, Nineteenth-Century Federal Timber Policy, and the Conservation Movement 39 1979
Hansen, Zeynep K.Libecap, Gary D.Small Farms, Externalities, and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s 112 2004
Epstein, Richard A.The Public Trust Doctrine 7 1987
Anderson, Terry L.Johnson, Ronald N.The Problem of Instream Flow 24 1986
Meiners, Roger E.Kosnik, Lea-Rachel 2003
Cooter, Robert D.Rubinfeld, Daniel L.Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution 27 1989
Williamson, Oliver 1975
Williamson, Oliver 1985
Dahlman, CarlThe Problem of Externality 22 1979
Barzel, YoramMeasurement Cost and Organization of Markets 25 1982
1990
Johnson, Ronald N.Libecap, Gary D.Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery 72 1982
Adler, Jonathan H. 2005
2005
Libecap, Gary D. 2003
2001
Michalak, Anna 2004
Yandle, Bruce 2004
Lueck, DeanOwnership and the Regulation of Wildlife 29 1991
Lueck, DeanThe Economic Nature of Wildlife Law 18 1989
Anderson, Terry L. 1998
Lueck, DeanMichael, Jeffrey A.Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the Endangered Species Act 46 2003
Bayon, Ricardo 2002
1997
1971
Johnson, Ronald N.Libecap, Gary D.Efficient Markets and Great Lakes Timber: A Conservation Issue Reexamined 17 1980
Grafton, R. QuentinPrivate Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource 43 2000
Myers, Ransom A.Worm, BorisRapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities 423 2003PubMed
Leal, Donald R. 2002
Myers and Worm 2005

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×