Book contents
- The Perils of International Capital
- The Perils of International Capital
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Politics of International Capital
- 2 International Capital and Authoritarian Survival
- 3 Foreign Rents and Rule
- 4 Aiding Repression
- 5 Remittances and Autocratic Power
- 6 Foreign Direct Investment in Militarism
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Index
4 - Aiding Repression
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 December 2019
- The Perils of International Capital
- The Perils of International Capital
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Politics of International Capital
- 2 International Capital and Authoritarian Survival
- 3 Foreign Rents and Rule
- 4 Aiding Repression
- 5 Remittances and Autocratic Power
- 6 Foreign Direct Investment in Militarism
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
A central argument in Chapter 3 is the proposition that autocrats can use nontax income to finance a combination of repression and patronage as a means of extending their tenure in office. While various scholars have investigated the relationship between foreign aid and patronage, there is surprisingly less scholarship evaluating the impact of aid on repression. With this in mind, this chapter presents robust evidence that foreign aid from the world’s largest bilateral – the United States – can harm political rights, expand the powers of dictators, and entrench nondemocratic institutions in recipient states. As this chapter describes in greater detail, one such example is General Siad Barre’s use of US aid to finance his repressive dictatorial rule.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Perils of International Capital , pp. 76 - 102Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019