In chapter 7, Craig Duncan distinguishes between two broad versions of the Many Gods Objection: what he calls the “Ambitious Many Gods Objection” and the “Modest Many Gods Objection.” The former presents us with a plurality of theological hypotheses each offering the possibility of infinite utility; hence, there is no singular choice with infinite expected utility. Duncan criticizes this “ambitious” version of the objection on the grounds that it unreasonably regards as irrelevant the relative probabilities of salvation associated with the various theological hypotheses. The “modest” version of the objection avoids this criticism by replacing the standard infinite utility of salvation with an “arbitrarily large” finite value. Construed thusly, distinct probabilities of salvation lead to different expected utilities; probabilities thereby retain their decision-theoretic relevance. Duncan then addresses the relative plausibility of a traditional Christian god versus a non-standard god who favors religious skeptics. While the latter deity is admittedly unlikely, Duncan argues that we are in no epistemic position to judge that the former deity is any more likely, since that deity’s practice of salvific exclusivism is highly unlikely on moral grounds. Thus, even the “modest” version of the Many Gods Objection renders the Wager indeterminate, and thereby defeats it.