2 - Nature and Motion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 October 2009
Summary
Before turning to Aristotle's arguments on place and void, we must consider the structure of Physics IV as a logos and its relation to the other books of the Physics, especially Physics II and III. In Physics II, 1, Aristotle defines nature as a source of motion and rest (192b14); Physics III, 1, opens with the claim that in order to understand nature, we must also understand motion (200b12–14). In effect, Physics III starts from the subject of physics established in Physics II. In short, motion and nature are coextensive, they are found together, and they, and those things required by them, form the primary subject matter of physics as a science. Hence, Aristotle concludes, it is clear that universal and common things must be examined first, namely, motion and those things without which motion seems to be impossible, including the infinite, place, void, time, and the continuous.
The Structure of the Arguments
Aristotle proceeds accordingly. First, “motion” is defined (Physics III, 1-3), and then “the infinite” (Physics III, 3–8). “Place,” “void,” and “time” occupy Physics IV, while “the continuous” along with the related notions “in contact” and “in succession,” “points,” and “lines” occupy Physics V and VI. These terms follow motion and nature not only rhetorically – they are next in the text – but also logically. That is, the examination of them presupposes the definition of motion that he has just established. Hence, place and void are considered, defined, and evaluated in terms of Aristotle's definitions of motion and ultimately nature.
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- Information
- The Order of Nature in Aristotle's PhysicsPlace and the Elements, pp. 34 - 65Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998