The end of blitzkrieg

The declining strength of the motorised divisions was not the only factor compromising their ability to function effectively. The discordant strategic deployment of each corps – fanning out towards divergent objectives over wide areas – denied them the benefits of concentration and forced them to operate in a degree of isolation. The most far-flung and wayward operation was that of Kuntzen's LVII Panzer Corps, which, on Halder's orders (and against Bock's better judgement), was sent to enact a joint encirclement with Leeb's Army Group North. After a difficult drive over sunken roads, the spearhead of the corps (19th Panzer Division) took Nevel on 15 July. From here the division could have swung north and encircled the Soviet 51st Rifle Corps (as intended by Halder) or south to envelope the 62nd Rifle Corps, yet both of these options were disregarded by Hoth who instead ordered a continued forward drive to the northeast to seize Velikie Luki. There can be no question of Velikie Luki's strategic importance, yet Bock's concern that individual panzer corps had become too weak to operate alone was especially relevant to Kuntzen's corps given that it only consisted of two divisions (19th Panzer Division and 14th Motorised Division). With strong enemy forces on each flank from the retreating Soviet 22nd Army and the newly constituted Soviet 29th Army forming to the east of Velikie Luki, Hoth's thrust shifted from bold forward operations to senseless folly. The war diary of the LVII Panzer Corps makes clear that just reaching its objective required the fullest commitment of all its resources with no available reserves, and although the 19th Panzer Division captured Velikie Luki on 19 July the success was short lived. Holding the rear flanks of the corridor was the hapless 14th Motorised Division which, by the afternoon of 19 July, was expecting massed Soviet attacks on multiple fronts. The division's materiel was noted to be ‘completely worn out’ and widely dispersed meaning that ‘a massed Russian attack can hardly be held.’ In the early hours of 20 July the vigorous Soviet attack broke through the German line in multiple places, forcing an indignant Kluge to order the 19th Panzer Division back to the aid of the 14th Motorised Division. Bock too was unswerving in his criticism.