If the totality of war is to be measured by the involvement of private industry and the degree to which its potential is used, Prussia in 1870-71 was most certainly at the very beginning of the road to total war. It continued to be vital to the military leadership that it remain in full control over every material aspect of warfare and would not have to compromise with private industry. Previous wars had been short and could largely be conducted on the basis of the inventories and the output of the military's own armories. To a large extent, this was still the case in the Franco-Prussian War. Losses of material were modest even more so since the victorious German armies controlled the battlefield and could easily recoup arms of their own troops as well as of the enemy. The total consumption of artillery guns on the German side was not more than 116 barrels (92 Prussians, 23 Bavarians, and 1 Wiirttemberger). The total loss of rifles is not known, but the Twelfth Army Corps, for example, did not have to receive more than 33 needle-guns and 39 breechloaders (Hinterlader-Karabiner) during the campaign.

The nonprofit character of the army's own factories, the full control over costs and quality, and the greatly reduced risk of labor unrest had made this arrangement very attractive in the eyes of most officers. After all, the growing discontent with the performance of private entrepreneurs, high prices, and low quality of the weapons that they produced had led to the establishment of state-owned and state-run rifle factories in the early 1850s.