Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Introduction: Gherardo Colombo’s Concern for the Democratic State under the Rule of Law: A Work in Progress
- Why?
- 1 An Imaginary Country
- Contents
- Part I The Ambiguities of Justice
- Part II Horizontal Society and Vertical Society
- Part III Towards a Horizontal Society
- Part IV How Do We Get There?
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgments
18 - Limits to Personal Liberty
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 December 2020
- Frontmatter
- Introduction: Gherardo Colombo’s Concern for the Democratic State under the Rule of Law: A Work in Progress
- Why?
- 1 An Imaginary Country
- Contents
- Part I The Ambiguities of Justice
- Part II Horizontal Society and Vertical Society
- Part III Towards a Horizontal Society
- Part IV How Do We Get There?
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgments
Summary
We can now return to the objection raised in previous pages, namely that life together could not be organised without admitting that, at least occasionally, the fundamental rights of individual members of the community must be compromised, including the basic right to personal liberty.
Now, within the perspective and context of a society which is organised according to different tenets and with different points of reference, this issue is drastically reduced.
The question is, in principle, to check whether a detention facility can be utilised not to inflict a punishment, nor for retributive purposes, or general prevention, but only to neutralise those individuals who, if they were to be reintegrated into society, would continue to attack the rights of other people. These are isolated cases, in which separation is qualitatively different from imprisonment: it only entails the physical hindrance from doing further harm and is instrumental to the rehabilitation of the person, which remains the primary objective of any intervention.
Respect for the dignity of a human being requires that such a restrictive measure as the deprivation of personal liberty be allowed only when fundamental rights of equal or higher importance are threatened. Following this approach, the respect for dignity does not tolerate suffering as an end in itself, nor as a consequence of retributive demands. The duration of limits on freedom should be proportional to the requirements of rehabilitation, rather than to the seriousness of the offence, and neutralisation cannot limit personal rights that do not clash with community protection.
It is no use hiding the fact that moving from a sanction system to a rehabilitation system requires time and modulation. The process, however, must follow a set of tenets.
Neutralisation must be carried out using measures different from detention whenever they suffice. Even when there is no alternative, a limitation on personal liberty must respect the dignity of the individual.
As a consequence, the conditions of imprisonment cannot entail the degradation, either physical or psychological, of those incarcerated.
Therefore detention in overcrowded facilities is not allowed. Emotional relationships cannot be severed or limited except for organisational reasons, or in order to protect the community effectively.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- On Rules , pp. 95 - 96Publisher: Amsterdam University PressPrint publication year: 2016