Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-nmvwc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-02T06:29:44.530Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Classical and Keynesian features in macroeconomic models with imperfect competition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 October 2009

Huw David Dixon
Affiliation:
University of York
Neil Rankin
Affiliation:
University of Warwick
Get access

Summary

Introduction

Recent years have seen a rapidly growing development of macroeconomic models based on imperfect competition. A strong point of these models is that they are able to generate inefficient macroeconomic equilibria, obviously an important characteristic nowadays, while maintaining rigorous microfoundations. Indeed in these models both price and quantity decisions are made rationally by maximizing agents internal to the system, which thus differentiates them from Keynesian models, where the price formation process is a priori given, and also from classical (i.e. Walrasian) models, where the job of price-making is left to the implicit auctioneer.

Since for many years the macroeconomic debate has been dominated by the ‘classical versus Keynesian’ opposition, a question often posed by various authors, both inside and outside the domain, is whether these macroeconomic models with imperfect competition have more ‘classical’ or ‘Keynesian’ properties. The debate on this issue has sometimes become rather muddled and the purpose of this chapter is to give a few basic answers in a simple and expository way. This we shall do not by reviewing all contributions to the subject (there are already two excellent review articles, by Dixon and Rankin, 1994 and Silvestre, 1993), but by constructing a simple ‘prototype’ model with rigorous microfoundations, including notably rational expectations and objective demand curves, and examining how its various properties relate to those of Keynesian and classical models.

Type
Chapter
Information
The New Macroeconomics
Imperfect Markets and Policy Effectiveness
, pp. 15 - 33
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×