Professor Andy Clark's splendid essay represents a step forward from which there should be no retreat. Our de facto moral cognition involves a complex and evolving interplay between, on the one hand, the nondiscursive cognitive mechanisms of the biological brain, and on the other, the often highly discursive extrapersonal “scaffolding” that structures the social world in which our brains are normally situated, a world that has been, to a large extent, created by our own moral and political activity. That interplay extends the reach and elevates the quality of the original nondiscursive cognition, and thus any adequate account of moral cognition must address both of these contributing dimensions. An account that focuses only on brain mechanisms will be missing something vital.

I endorse these claims, so compellingly argued by Clark, for much the same reasons that I also endorse the following claims. Our de facto scientific cognition involves a complex and evolving interplay between, on the one hand, the nondiscursive cognitive mechanisms of the biological brain, and on the other, the often highly discursive extrapersonal “scaffolding” that structures the social-scientific world in which the brains of scientists are normally situated, a technologically and institutionally intricate world that has been, to a large extent, created by our own scientific activities. That interplay extends the reach and elevates the quality of the original nondiscursive cognition, and thus any adequate account of scientific cognition must address both of these contributing dimensions.