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9 - Auctions

from Part II - Game Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

David Easley
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Jon Kleinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

In Chapter 8, we considered a first extended application of game-theoretic ideas in our analysis of traffic flow through a network. Here we consider a second major application – the behavior of buyers and sellers in an auction.

An auction is a kind of economic activity that has been brought into many people's everyday lives by the Internet, through sites such as eBay. But auctions also have a long history that spans many different domains. For example, the U.S. government uses auctions to sell Treasury bills and timber and oil leases; Christie's and Sotheby's use them to sell art; and Morrell & Company and the Chicago Wine Company use them to sell wine.

Auctions will also play an important and recurring role in this book, since the simplified form of buyer–seller interaction they embody is closely related to more complex forms of economic interaction as well. In particular, in the next part of the book, when we discuss markets in which multiple buyers and sellers are connected by an underlying network structure, we'll use ideas initially developed in this chapter for understanding simpler auction formats. Similarly, in Chapter 15, we'll study a more complex kind of auction in the context of a Web search application, analyzing the ways in which search companies like Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft use an auction format to sell advertising rights for keywords.

Types of Auctions

In this chapter we focus on different simple types of auctions and how they promote different kinds of behavior among bidders. We consider the case of a seller auctioning one item to a set of buyers.

Type
Chapter
Information
Networks, Crowds, and Markets
Reasoning about a Highly Connected World
, pp. 225 - 246
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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  • Auctions
  • David Easley, Cornell University, New York, Jon Kleinberg, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: Networks, Crowds, and Markets
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761942.010
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  • Auctions
  • David Easley, Cornell University, New York, Jon Kleinberg, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: Networks, Crowds, and Markets
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761942.010
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Auctions
  • David Easley, Cornell University, New York, Jon Kleinberg, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: Networks, Crowds, and Markets
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761942.010
Available formats
×