This chapter offers a preliminary formulation of the concept of law, understood as a representation of a group of features clustered around some prototype case. In proceeding from the idea that our pre-analytical samples of law have to account for various social contexts, including the one beyond the state, in which the concept-word is used to denote this complex human practice, the undertaken jurisprudential inquiry leads to the preliminary finding: a social practice is typically judged as falling within the category of ‘law’ if it consists of rules purporting to coordinate behavior of actors and to settle their disputes (normativity); if it at least possesses institutions in charge of judging whether those rules were violated (institutionality); if the rules in question are guaranteed, normally through some form of coercive mechanisms([coercive] guaranteeing); and if the rules are, overall, apt for inspection and appraisal in light of justice (justice-aptness). These typical features vary depending on contexts (e.g. municipal v. international level; simple v. modern society).