Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-lvtdw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-09T02:08:45.501Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - Aligning All Employee Pay to Improve Corporate Performance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 July 2009

Ira Kay
Affiliation:
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Washington, DC
Steven Van Putten
Affiliation:
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Washington, DC
Get access

Summary

In the past twenty-five years, researchers have done more than seventy empirical studies of these [broad-based employee stock ownership] forms of risk sharing. Taken together, the studies provide compelling evidence for the net gain that the partnership approach can produce for a company's public shareholders.

Joseph Blasi, Douglas Kruse, and Aaron Bernstein, In the Company of Owners: The Truth About Stock Options and Why Every Employee Should Have Them

All employees perform at higher levels when they are eligible for performance-based short-term and stock-based incentives. This common framework makes it possible to align executive pay with pay for broader employee groups and provide sharply higher pay for top performers at all levels – crucial elements in a company's success.

Unfortunately, most of the controversy surrounding executive pay in recent years has focused on ways to create a false alignment by regulating the compensation process and limiting the amounts of pay that would otherwise be set by market forces.

Critics argue that by lowering executive pay, morale – and therefore productivity – will be higher because employees will believe that they are being treated fairly. There is no empirical evidence to support this position. Studies of internal pay equity and perceptions of fairness show that employees focus on the effectiveness and fairness of the performance measurement and evaluation process rather than the actual amounts of compensation.

In other words, companies should strive to create alignment by making nonexecutive compensation more like executive compensation instead of by restricting executive pay.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×