Why Naturalism?

David Copp

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511497940.003

1 - Why Naturalism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 July 2009

David Copp

Show author details

David Copp: Affiliation:
University of Florida

Book contents

Get access

Summary

My goal in this chapter is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and nonnaturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. It is no part of my goal to establish the truth of naturalism. There are various familiar objections to it, including, most importantly, the objection that naturalism cannot explain the normativity of moral judgment. In this chapter, my goal is simply to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile.

An ethical naturalist holds that there are moral properties and relations – for example, there are moral rightness, goodness, justice, and virtuousness – and she holds that these properties and relations are ‘natural.’ Accordingly, when a naturalist hears us say that something is right or wrong, just or unjust, she takes the truth of what we say to depend on whether the relevant thing has the relevant property, and she takes this to depend in turn exclusively on the way things are in the natural world. The chief problem, of course, is to explain what it might mean to claim that moral properties are natural properties. I think that once this is properly explained, naturalism will seem enormously attractive. If we believe that there are moral properties at all, we will find ourselves moved in the direction of naturalism.

Type: Chapter
Information: Morality in a Natural World
Selected Essays in Metaethics
, pp. 33 - 54

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497940.003 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Armstrong, David M. 1989. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.Google Scholar

Audi, Robert. 1998. “Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1: 15–44.CrossRef Google Scholar

Boghossian, Paul, and Christopher Peacocke. 2000a. “Introduction.” In Boghossian and Peacocke 2000b: 1–10.

Boghossian, Paul and Peacocke, Christopher, eds. 2000b. New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRef Google Scholar

Bonjour, Laurence. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Boyd, Richard. 1988. “How to Be a Moral Realist.” In Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, 181–228. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar

Brink, David O. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Google Scholar

Copp, David. 1995. Morality, Normativity, and Society. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Dancy, Jonathan. 2001. “Moral Particularism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2001 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. Http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall1999/entries/moral-particularism.

Darwall, Stephen, Gibbard, Allan, and Railton, Peter. 1992. “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics.” Philosophical Review 101: 115–189.CrossRef Google Scholar

Field, Hartry. 2000. “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion.” In Boghossian and Peacocke 2000b: 117–149.

Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Goldman, Alvin I. 1994. “Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: 301–320.CrossRef Google Scholar

Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Harman, Gilbert. 1977. The Nature of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Jackson, Frank. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

Kant, Immanuel. 1785. Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Ellington, James W.. Rpt., Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1981.Google Scholar

King, Jeffrey C. 1994. “Can Propositions Be Naturalistically Acceptable?” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: 53–75.CrossRef Google Scholar

Kitcher, Philip. 1983. The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Kitcher, Philip. 1992. “The Naturalists Return.” Philosophical Review 101: 53–114.CrossRef Google Scholar

Kitcher, Philip. 2000. “A Priori Knowledge Revisited.” In Boghossian and Peacocke 2000b: 65–91.Google Scholar

Kornblith, Hilary. 1994. “Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: 39–52.CrossRef Google Scholar

Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.Google Scholar

Miller, Richard W. 1985. “Ways of Moral Learning.” Philosophical Review 94: 502–550.CrossRef Google Scholar

Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Ed. Baldwin, Thomas. Rpt., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.Google Scholar

Moore, G. E.. 1968. “Reply to My Critics.” In The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, 3rd edition, ed. Schilpp, P. A., 535–687n. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.Google Scholar

Moore, G. E.. 1993a. “The Conception of Intrinsic Value.” In Principia Ethica, ed. Baldwin, Thomas, 280–298. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Moore, G. E.. 1993b. “Preface to the Second Edition.” In Principia Ethica, ed. Baldwin, Thomas, 1–37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Papineau, David. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar

Quine, W. V. O. 1961. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” In From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edition, 20–46. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Railton, Peter. 1989. “Naturalism and Prescriptivity.” Social Philosophy and Policy 7: 151–174.CrossRef Google Scholar

Sturgeon, Nicholas L. 1984. “Moral Explanations.” In Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, ed. Copp, David and Zimmerman, David, 49–78. Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Allanheld.

Book contents

1 - Why Naturalism?

Summary

Access options

References

Save book to Kindle

Save book to Dropbox

Save book to Google Drive