A view as widely endorsed as it is disputed says, formulating it in my own words: The only thing we have reason to do is promote value. This I will call The promotion of value thesis (or principle).

Variants of the promotion of value principle are widespread. They emerged as a generalization of an aspect of Utilitarianism, sometimes taken to be the plausible part of Utilitarianism. The promotion of value thesis is not committed to the Utilitarian account of value, namely that pleasure, the avoidance of pain or the satisfaction of preferences are the only things of value. It does, however, share with Utilitarianism an understanding of reasons for action.

In recent times something like the promotion of value thesis was regarded by many as obviously true. Even those who rejected it often acknowledged its power and appeal. Opposition to the thesis triggered some influential developments in the writings on practical reason over the last 30 years or so. Contemporary Contractualism, for example, arose as a way of rebutting it.

In this paper I will argue against the thesis, suggesting that, first, an account of practical rationality has to include an account of reasons for action. Second, that while it is a principle of rationality that we should act for the better reason(s) that principle has nothing to do with maximization, or the promotion of value. Third, that no version of the promotion of value principle that I can think of is consistent with various reasons for action whose existence is known to us.