Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-fv566 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T19:45:34.597Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

6 - The Inevitability of Folk Psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 September 2009

Get access

Summary

There are many things one can mean by folk psychology, and most of them exist. One can mean the characteristic commonsense uocabulary of mind: ‘belief, desire’, ‘memory’, ‘fear’, and so indefinitely on. One can mean explanatory theories of different degrees of generality, current in different cultures. One can mean the beliefs one forms about particular people at particular times. One can mean the strategies for forming beliefs, expressed in commonsense terms, which can be used in explaining people's actions. All of these have their place. I am particularly interested in the last of them, strategies. (Perhaps it is the only one whose existence could be seriously questioned!)

The important questions about all of these can be classified as semantical and syntactica. Semantical questions concern relations to nonconceptual things: Do vernacular psychological terms refer to real features of people? Are any of the theories true? Syntactical questions concern form and mental representation: Do we learn the theories one by one as part of our general wordly lore? Are the meanings of the terms represented by definitions in a language of thought or by some connectionist schema?

Semantical and syntactical questions interact. In particular the answers one gives to semantical questions about folk psychology partly determine which syntactical questions it makes sense to ask. Someone might, for example, deny that folk psychology involves any beliefs at all. (She might think it consists just of attitudes such as affection and fear.)

Type
Chapter
Information
Mind and Common Sense
Philosophical Essays on Common Sense Psychology
, pp. 93 - 122
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1991

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×