Innumerable people have helped with this effort to suggest the extent of the problems associated with the adaptation that military institutions involved in the conduct of combat operations invariably must confront. In particular, I must thank Andrew Marshall for the trust he showed in my work by providing the funding for much of the research and writing of the manuscript on which this book rests. I must also thank my colleagues at the Institute for Defense Analyses, who read and commented extensively on all of the chapters in their various iterations. In particular, I am grateful for all the work and hours that Karl Lowe, Jim Lacey, Kevin Woods, Jim Kurtz, and, in particular, Katy-Dean Price put in in attempting to whip ill-formed thoughts and syntax into a presentable whole. Outside of the Institute for Defense Analyses, I am particularly grateful for the succinct, sharp, and intelligent comments that Richard Sinnreich provided as he read through various drafts. I also need to thank Shimon Naveh, Dov Tamari, and Ofra Gracier for all their work in arranging, translating where necessary, and supporting my research efforts in Israel. I would be remiss if I were to not also thank the Class of 1957 of the United States Naval Academy for the Chair that the members endowed at the academy and which they allowed me to hold for two years. Finally, I must thank my long-suffering wife, Dr. Lesley Mary Smith, who patiently read and reread chapter after chapter and who attempted to force me to support my suppositions with real arguments and real facts. In the end though, whatever mistakes exist in this work are mine and mine alone.

The problem of adaptation in war represents one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined problems that military institutions confront. As Michael Howard has suggested, military organizations inevitably get the next war wrong, mostly for reasons that lie beyond their control. Consequently, one of the foremost attributes of military effectiveness must lie in the ability of armies, navies, or air forces to recognize and adapt to the actual conditions of combat, as well as to the new tactical, operational, and strategic, not to mention political, challenges that war inevitably throws up. This observation has proven increasingly true throughout the course of the twentieth century, in small wars as well as major conflicts, and there is every reason to believe it will continue to be true in the twenty-first century.