Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-4rdrl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-28T08:32:24.792Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Quasi-Competitive Price Adjustment by Individual Firms: A Preliminary Paper (1970)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 March 2010

Franklin M. Fisher
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Get access

Summary

Introduction

One of the principal unfilled holes in microeconomic theory is of deep importance. We have a satisfactory theory of equilibrium in perfect competition; despite great and admirable labor by many leading theorists, we have no similarly satisfactory theory of how equilibrium is reached. Such adjustment models as have been proposed and studied generally are less than satisfactory, for they rest on assumptions (often plausible ones) about the way in which prices behave in different markets taken as a whole, rather than on a model of individual behavior. Thus, as is well known, the tâtonnement process involves the assumption that the rate of change of price is proportional to excess demand, and even the non-tâtonnement processes that have been studied incorporate a similar price adjustment mechanism while allowing trade to take place out of equilibrium. Yet, as Koopmans has pointed out, it is far from clear whose behavior is described by that price adjustment process in markets where there is in fact no auctioneer to conduct it.

The problem can be described in a related but different way. In a perfectly competitive market, all participants take price as given and believe that they cannot affect it; yet when that market is in disequilibrium, the price is supposed to move. The Invisible Hand is a little too invisible in this, the center of its activities.

Type
Chapter
Information
Microeconomics
Essays in Theory and Applications
, pp. 51 - 62
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×