Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- General Introduction
- Part I The Strategic and Fiscal Context
- Part II The Financing of Naval Expenditure
- Part III Paymaster Accountability and the Limitations of the State
- Part IV The Development and Management of the Naval Treasury
- Part V Fiscal Overextension and Operational Paralysis in the Era of the Spanish Succession
- Conclusion
- Appendix I Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Spanish Succession conflict, 1700–13
- Appendix II Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Nine Years’ War, 1689–99
- Appendix III Royal revenues in livres excluding the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix IV Royal revenues in livres including the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix V The average geographical distribution of Louis XIV's fleet in terms of rated warships and frégates légères, 1701–09
- Appendix VI Naval spending by area of expenditure, 1701–09
- Appendix VII The time frame in which the trésoriers were ordered to acquit naval costs, 1701–09
- Appendix VIII Summary of borrowing by trésorier Jacques de Vanolles during the exercice of 1703
- Appendix IX Detailed breakdown by source of revenue of the funding provided to the naval and galley treasuries, 1702–08
- Select Bibliography
- Index
12 - The Collapse of French Naval Power, 1707–09
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 February 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- General Introduction
- Part I The Strategic and Fiscal Context
- Part II The Financing of Naval Expenditure
- Part III Paymaster Accountability and the Limitations of the State
- Part IV The Development and Management of the Naval Treasury
- Part V Fiscal Overextension and Operational Paralysis in the Era of the Spanish Succession
- Conclusion
- Appendix I Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Spanish Succession conflict, 1700–13
- Appendix II Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Nine Years’ War, 1689–99
- Appendix III Royal revenues in livres excluding the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix IV Royal revenues in livres including the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix V The average geographical distribution of Louis XIV's fleet in terms of rated warships and frégates légères, 1701–09
- Appendix VI Naval spending by area of expenditure, 1701–09
- Appendix VII The time frame in which the trésoriers were ordered to acquit naval costs, 1701–09
- Appendix VIII Summary of borrowing by trésorier Jacques de Vanolles during the exercice of 1703
- Appendix IX Detailed breakdown by source of revenue of the funding provided to the naval and galley treasuries, 1702–08
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The cumulative effects of overspending and underfunding, as well as the extent to which the trésoriers were limiting payments according to their personal financial situations, caused the navy to become cash-flow insolvent over the course of 1707 to 1709. The diminishing levels of liquidity had disastrous consequences for naval procurement, and the inability to acquire essential materials translated short-term funding issues into years of operational paralysis. Procurement was a lengthy and complex process that drained the trésoriers’ cash and involved an extensive network of suppliers who relied on a schedule of regular payments in advance of delivery. This was particularly the case in the arms industry, where cash was needed to finance large capital investments. For example, a munitions order with the St Gervais foundry, which supplied Toulon's arsenal with 73 cannons, required 72 per cent of its value acquitted at least four to five months before the first consignment of cannons was delivered in October 1706. However, as the trésoriers had to devote a disproportionate amount of resources and time to addressing unsettled debts from previous exercices, the navy could no longer afford or keep up with these upfront payments and regular disbursements that contractors required. Increasing interruptions in the settlement of procurement bills damaged suppliers’ confidence and created further dysfunction: for instance, in two comparable deliveries of hemp from Auvergne to Nantes and Rochefort during the exercices of 1705 and 1706, the delay between the initial and final payments of the orders grew from nine to 22 months. Moreover, when the suppliers were paid, they increasingly received illiquid credit instruments that became untradeable as faith in the trésoriers’ credit eroded. Contractors thereafter sought cash guarantees or the ability to bypass the trésoriers and deal directly with the crown's revenue agents, but as these demands became prohibitive, naval administrators were left unable to sign many suppliers to new contracts, even with the enticement of price increases. This left the navy in an ‘unfortunate state’, as Pontchartrain described the situation in the spring of 1707, and contributed to a precipitous drop in procurement spending, which fell 44 per cent from 9.6 million l. to 5.4 million l. between 1705 and 1707.
The availability of cash to the navy was significantly reduced during the exercice of 1707.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Maritime Power and the Power of Money in Louis XIV's FrancePrivate Finance, the Contractor State, and the French Navy, pp. 216 - 227Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2023