In the last decades, early modern casuistry has attracted much attention. In particular, two elements have raised interest: on the one hand, the methodological character of casuistry, which aimed to analyse moral action through a strict interpretive grid; on the other hand, its focus on historical actors and on their specific deeds. Depending on their specializations, scholars have studied casuistry as a method applicable for solving problems of human bioethics or as an epistemological instrument that might help social sciences rethink the role of individual agency in historical development.

However, in a strictly historical view, casuistry had first of all a regulatory function during the early modern period. Narrowly entwined with canon law and the ius commune, it forged a normative order, within which individuals and institutions could take their decisions. This art of decision-making was not limited to the forum internum, that is, to the realm of the individual conscience. Certainly, as many studies have shown us, confessors widely used the summae casuum in order to transpose the assumptions of moral theology into prescriptions for the spiritual guidance of the faithful. But casuistry was not only the meticulous description of sinful situations. Far from that, it addressed complex ethical issues, relevant to early modern society as a whole, and was omnipresent both in legal works and in treatises of moral theology. From this standpoint, casuistry was a recognized style of reasoning, which offered normative answers to determined social and political situations.