Introduction

While the principal focus of this work is upon the conservation of wildlife populations, the philosophical arguments canvassed in Chapter 3 above suggest that the intrinsic value exhibited by each autopoietic entity embraces not only the good-of-its-kind, but also the good-of-its-own: consequently, any sound ethical policy should additionally have regard to the extent to which individual organisms are permitted to flourish in accordance with their biological nature. Accordingly, insofar as such arguments merit credence in the realm of international affairs, it might be expected that a body of rules would also have emerged for the protection of individual wildlife specimens, seen not only as representatives of their kind but as legitimate objects of moral concern on their own account. The need for such measures, moreover, is plainly most acute in the case of sentient animals, whose capacity for pain and suffering generates a particularly cogent case for protection.

Formal recognition of these points may be found in the revised version of the World Conservation Strategy, Caring for the Earth, which proclaims,