A Logical Foundation for Potentialist Set Theory - Title page

pp iii-iii

Copyright page

pp iv-iv

Contents

pp v-vi

Acknowledgments

pp vii-viii

1 - Introduction

pp 1-10

Part I

pp 11-78

2 - Actualist Set Theory

pp 13-30

3 - Putnamian Potentialism: Putnam and Hellman

pp 31-41

4 - Overview of My Proposal

pp 42-56

5 - Parsonian Potentialism

pp 57-78

Part II

pp 79-108

6 - Purified Potentialist Set Theory: An Informal Sketch

pp 81-86

7 - Content Restriction

pp 87-93

8 - Inference Rules

pp 94-101

9 - Defense of ZFC

pp 102-108

Part III

pp 109-204

10 - Platonism or Nominalism?

pp 111-115

11 - Indispensability

pp 116-125

12 - Modal If-Thenist Paraphrase Strategy

pp 126-134

13 - Explanatory Indispensability

pp 135-145

14 - Physical Magnitude Statements and Sparsity

pp 146-154

15 - Weak Quantifier Variance and Mathematical Objects

pp 155-166

16 - Weak Quantifier Variance, Knowledge by Stipulative Definition and Access Worries

pp 167-182

17 - Logicism and Structuralism

pp 183-188

18 - Anti-Objectivism About Set Theory

pp 189-201

19 - Conclusion

pp 202-204

Appendices

pp 205-231

Appendix A - Logico-Structural Potentialism

pp 205-209

Appendix B - Notation and Some Example Arguments

pp 210-222