I now have to turn to a more profound and explicit investigation into the concern of the State for the mutual security of the citizens. For it does not seem enough merely to commit the care for security to the political power as a general and unconditional duty, but we also need to define the specific limits of its activity in this respect; or, at least, should this general definition be difficult or wholly impossible, to show the reasons for this, and discover the characteristics by which these limits may, in given cases, be recognized.

Even a very limited experience is sufficient to convince us that this interference may be either very limited or very extensive. It can confine itself to correcting actual disorders or it may take precautions for preventing their occurrence, or even adopt the policy of moulding the mind and character of the citizen after the fashion most suitable to its preconceived scheme of social order. Even this extension admits of different degrees. The violation of personal rights, for example, or of the immediate rights of the State, may be investigated and punished, or—by regarding the citizen as accountable to the State for the use of his abilities, and therefore as one who robs it, as it were, of its property when he does anything to weaken or destroy them—a watchful eye may be kept on even those actions which affect none but the agent himself.