The results to this point have shown that promise keeping is widespread, that it varies in a systematic way across legislators, and that it both affects and is affected by their electoral prospects and their career decisions. These findings offer important insight into legislators' strategies and into the processes of responsiveness and accountability. As of yet, though, another piece of the puzzle remains largely unexplored – the policy implications of this activity. Do the measures that representatives and senators introduce and cosponsor on their campaign themes affect policy in a meaningful way? Or are these activities largely peripheral to lawmaking?

This is an issue that merits serious attention. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a tendency in the literature on Congress to separate legislators' activities into two categories: those that are serious and policy-oriented and those that are symbolic and undertaken largely for electoral reasons. The critique is that the latter are mostly frivolous and insincere and take scarce time and resources away from general interest legislation and other efforts aimed at solving big problems. Throughout this book, I have made the argument (not unique to me – see, for example, Hall 1996) that these need not be mutually exclusive. There is no reason that a particular introduction or cosponsorship can fulfill one goal or the other but not both, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to classify individual measures as such, since their effects can be indirect and/or outside the control of the particular legislators who are involved with a piece of legislation.