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7 - Nondelegation Principles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 August 2009

Cass R. Sunstein
Affiliation:
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science University of Chicago
Richard W. Bauman
Affiliation:
University of Alberta
Tsvi Kahana
Affiliation:
Queen's University, Ontario
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Summary

The American Constitution, like many other constitutions, is said to contain an interesting doctrine specifically designed to ensure democratic self-government. According to this doctrine, sometimes called “the nondelegation doctrine,” the national legislature is not permitted to give, or to delegate, its lawmaking powers to any other body.

Many people say that the nondelegation doctrine is dead. According to the refrain, the doctrine was once used to require Congress to legislate with some clarity, so as to ensure that law is made by the national legislature rather than by the executive. But the nondelegation doctrine – the refrain continues – is now merely a bit of rhetoric, as the United States Code has become littered with provisions asking one or another administrative agency to do whatever it thinks best. Although this is an overstatement, it captures an important truth: Since 1935, the Supreme Court has not struck down an act of Congress on nondelegation grounds, notwithstanding the existence of a number of plausible occasions.

Is the nondelegation doctrine really dead? To the extent that it is not flourishing, is there a way to promote its essential purposes, in a way that requires legislative deliberation on the most fundamental issues? I believe that the doctrine is actually alive and well. It has been relocated rather than abandoned. Federal courts commonly vindicate not a general nondelegation doctrine, which would raise serious problems, but a series of more specific and smaller, though quite important, nondelegation doctrines.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Least Examined Branch
The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State
, pp. 139 - 154
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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  • Nondelegation Principles
    • By Cass R. Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science University of Chicago
  • Edited by Richard W. Bauman, University of Alberta, Tsvi Kahana, Queen's University, Ontario
  • Book: The Least Examined Branch
  • Online publication: 06 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511035.009
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  • Nondelegation Principles
    • By Cass R. Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science University of Chicago
  • Edited by Richard W. Bauman, University of Alberta, Tsvi Kahana, Queen's University, Ontario
  • Book: The Least Examined Branch
  • Online publication: 06 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511035.009
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Nondelegation Principles
    • By Cass R. Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science University of Chicago
  • Edited by Richard W. Bauman, University of Alberta, Tsvi Kahana, Queen's University, Ontario
  • Book: The Least Examined Branch
  • Online publication: 06 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511035.009
Available formats
×