Summary

This book makes a simple point: leaders decide to initiate conflict at least partly on how conflict in turn affects not just the probability, but especially the manner of losing office. In particular, we argue that as the risk of a forcible removal increases, leaders become more likely to initiate international conflict. To establish this point, in Chapter 2 we developed a theoretical framework to explain which, when, and why leaders can obtain private benefits from international conflict. The answer, we argue, turns on leaders’ expectations about their personal fate out of office. In countries that have established norms, procedures, and institutions to protect leaders after they lose office, leaders can afford to lose office gracefully and participate in an institutionalized process of regular transfers of power. In countries that lack the institutions to protect leaders, they will be loath to turn over the reins of power, because that exposes them to significant personal punishments such as exile, imprisonment or death. The removal of such leaders then typically requires the threat or use of force.