In this work, I have tried to suggest that the doctrine of transcendental illusion offered in the Introduction to the Dialectic plays a crucial role in Kant's arguments. Toward this, I have argued for two general theses: first, that Kant's account of transcendental illusion grounds his criticisms of the specific arguments of dogmatic metaphysics and, second, that this notion of illusion has a distinct importance with respect to Kant's views on the positive, regulative function of reason. Clearly, these two claims are related. More specifically, Kant's assertion that the arguments of dogmatic metaphysics are all based on an illusion only makes sense in the broader context of his unique account of the nature and function of human reason. The connection between these two issues is made particularly clear when we consider what I have referred to as Kant's “inevitability thesis.”

I began this study by posing a problem that would seem to be generated for Kant by his inevitability thesis – that is, his claim that the fallacious inferences of metaphysics themselves (and because of a transcendental illusion) carry with them some kind of necessity, or inevitability. Once again, the problem centers on the fact that Kant wants to maintain both that there is something about the metaphysical doctrines that is inevitable or unavoidable and, yet, that his own transcendental critique enables us to avoid the “actual errors” involved in drawing the metaphysical conclusions.