Partition has rarely led to further dismemberment and secession, let alone to the demise of an existing state at least since the creation of the United Nations after World War II. A partition solution, once recognized by the international community, becomes a formidable barrier to further disintegration. By the same token, where partition does not result in the division into two exclusive national groups, there may be considerable pressure to accommodate the national minority residing in the partitioned state or, in the case of the irredentist state, to encourage subversion within the community as a means to weaken the new state protagonist.

The Israel–Palestinian case, however, is different from most cases of partition; Most were concerned with dividing territory and setting borders; few suffered from narratives of total displacement, which, according to the injured party, called for restoration of the situation based on the eradication of the state of affairs after displacement. This is where the Northern Ireland case is so instructive. The nationalist and Catholic majority believed they had a political claim to all of Ireland, which may partially explain why partition, acknowledged by the Catholic majority in 1922, did not result in stability; the arrangement was challenged actively by a minority of Irish citizens (with the tacit support of most of the rest) and arguably by the majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland itself. The challenge, coupled with higher population growth among Catholics, resulted in substantial political concessions on the part of the Protestant majority. In the Belfast Agreement, the Northern Ireland state lost its Protestant unionist character.