Introduction

In this essay I discuss how three Muslim men hold to be true apparently contradictory ideas about the legitimacy of saints. The principal argument is that much of the sociology of religion, at least as often expressed in contemporary anthropology, relies on somewhat static and instrumental notions of belief and knowledge. I illustrate this and demonstrate the consequences for the more general understanding of popular Islam and reformism in South Asia.

The kind of simplifying drudge I have in mind is most extremely characterized by surprisingly common statements such as ‘Muslims believe X and Y’, the error of which hardly need to be demonstrated. However, there are other levels at which this tendency operates. It requires cultivated personal or professional interests in order to question statements such as, ‘The Barelvis hold that spiritual intermediaries are a vital part of the society of Islam’. Such statements should beg the following kinds of questions: is this group of Muslims (associated with the teaching of Ahmed Rida Khan and Hanafi jurisprudence) formed solely by the uniformity of belief among its members? Do all spiritual intermediaries hold Barelvis in equal regard with other Muslims? Are all intermediaries held in equal regard by the Barelvis? Who says so? How do they know? What does it mean to believe or hold that something is true?