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Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others
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  • Cited by 53
  • Cited by
    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Barnes, Eric Christian 2005. Predictivism for Pluralists. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 56, Issue. 3, p. 421.

    de Almeida, Claudio 2007. Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons. Acta Analytica, Vol. 22, Issue. 4, p. 301.

    Belcher, Alice 2007. Trust in the Boardroom. Griffith Law Review, Vol. 16, Issue. 1, p. 151.

    Langsam, Harold 2007. Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Erkenntnis, Vol. 68, Issue. 1, p. 79.

    Elga, Adam 2007. Reflection and Disagreement. Nous, Vol. 41, Issue. 3, p. 478.

    Zagzebski, Linda 2007. Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy. Episteme, Vol. 4, Issue. 03, p. 252.

    Christensen, David 2009. Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 4, Issue. 5, p. 756.

    Godden, David M. 2010. The importance of belief in argumentation: belief, commitment and the effective resolution of a difference of opinion. Synthese, Vol. 172, Issue. 3, p. 397.

    Booth, Anthony Robert 2011. The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce. Erkenntnis, Vol. 75, Issue. 1, p. 37.

    Dougherty, Trent 2012. Reducing Responsibility: An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Blame. European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, Issue. 4, p. 534.

    HATZISTAVROU, ANTONY 2012. Motivation, Reconsideration and Exclusionary Reasons*. Ratio Juris, Vol. 25, Issue. 3, p. 318.

    Shieber, Joseph 2012. Against Credibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, Issue. 1, p. 1.

    Jones, Karen 2012. The Politics of Intellectual Self-trust. Social Epistemology, Vol. 26, Issue. 2, p. 237.

    Manson, Neil C. 2012. Epistemic restraint and the vice of curiosity. Philosophy, Vol. 87, Issue. 02, p. 239.

    Cresto, Eleonora 2012. A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 41, Issue. 6, p. 923.

    Goldberg, Sandy 2013. Self-Trust and Extended Trust: A Reliabilist Account. Res Philosophica, Vol. 90, Issue. 2, p. 277.

    Beardman, Stephanie 2013. A Non-factualist defense of the Reflection principle. Synthese, Vol. 190, Issue. 15, p. 2981.

    Coffman, E. J. and Deaton, Matt 2013. Problems for Foley's Accounts of Rational Belief and Responsible Belief. Res Philosophica, Vol. 90, Issue. 2, p. 147.

    Licon, Jimmy Alfonso 2013. On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View. Philosophia, Vol. 41, Issue. 3, p. 809.

    Holley, David M. 2013. Religious disagreements and epistemic rationality. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 74, Issue. 1, p. 33.

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    Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others
    • Online ISBN: 9780511498923
    • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498923
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Book description

To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defence of the reliability of one's faculties, methods and opinions that does not beg the question. Moreover, he shows how this account of intellectual self-trust can be used to understand the degree to which it is reasonable to rely on alternative authorities. This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the centre of intellectual trust.

Reviews

‘… a novel attempt to address the important and neglected topic of intellectual trust. Foley is clear and original. his book should be read.’

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly

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