Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Foreword
- Chronology
- Introduction
- PART I UNITING THE EUROPEAN UNION (June 2016–December 2017)
- PART II ON THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR A BESPOKE RELATIONSHIP (July 2016–November 2018)
- PART III ON THE BORDER BETWEEN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND (June 2017–December 2020)
- PART IV THE JOURNEY TOWARDS THE MEANING OF BREXIT (2020–)
- Conclusion
- Plate Section
- Index
Q - Was Mutti Merkel tougher than the rest?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2024
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Foreword
- Chronology
- Introduction
- PART I UNITING THE EUROPEAN UNION (June 2016–December 2017)
- PART II ON THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR A BESPOKE RELATIONSHIP (July 2016–November 2018)
- PART III ON THE BORDER BETWEEN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND (June 2017–December 2020)
- PART IV THE JOURNEY TOWARDS THE MEANING OF BREXIT (2020–)
- Conclusion
- Plate Section
- Index
Summary
A recurrent UK critique claimed Barnier was a theologian of the EU project for whom dogma was more important than a good outcome. Dominic Raab's “computer says no” mantra, originally a recurring sketch in the comedy series Little Britain, attacked Barnier's “rigidity”. Moderate Remainers and Brexiters echoed it in favour of a Chequers’ style relationship. Gavin Barwell wrote in his book Chief of Staff that Berlin, The Hague and even Juncker wanted to be more accommodating than Barnier, as if Barnier had a checklist that prohibited applying the creativity national governments or his own president wanted from him. An email annotation from Barnier's team just before Salzburg stated Downing Street thought Chequers still had a 60 per cent chance, partly based on positive vibes from May's meetings with Macron and Merkel. It concluded “in summary, a lot of wishful thinking”, based on Brussels’ own intelligence from national capitals.
The German cavalry coming to the rescue of the UK to rein in Barnier and protect its export economy was a chimera and yet remained a recurring meme in London during three and a half years of negotiations. The reality of negotiations looked often different. When Barnier tried in October 2017 to push Berlin and Paris to move beyond phase one into a discussion on the future, both capitals stopped him in his tracks. One episode of the December 2017 European Council offers another challenge to the meme that a pragmatic Berlin wanted to shift a hard-line Commission towards a more sensible approach. It was 14 December, late in the afternoon, when a few advisors conferred in Barnier's office. Earlier on that day, Merkel had surprised her closest counsellors and questioned a plan submitted to her on the plane. She was flying to Brussels to attend the European Council, a few months after the German elections of September 2017. Diplomats had indicated in preparatory meetings that Berlin could agree to a “standstill transition”, giving early certainty to British companies on that transition. On the plane, Merkel sat in the front with a few close advisors and expressed doubts. She found this too generous to the UK.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Inside the DealHow the EU Got Brexit Done, pp. 117 - 120Publisher: Agenda PublishingPrint publication year: 2023