Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Foreword
- Chronology
- Introduction
- PART I UNITING THE EUROPEAN UNION (June 2016–December 2017)
- PART II ON THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR A BESPOKE RELATIONSHIP (July 2016–November 2018)
- PART III ON THE BORDER BETWEEN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND (June 2017–December 2020)
- PART IV THE JOURNEY TOWARDS THE MEANING OF BREXIT (2020–)
- Conclusion
- Plate Section
- Index
Q - Did the EU fail to understand Northern Ireland?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2024
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Foreword
- Chronology
- Introduction
- PART I UNITING THE EUROPEAN UNION (June 2016–December 2017)
- PART II ON THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR A BESPOKE RELATIONSHIP (July 2016–November 2018)
- PART III ON THE BORDER BETWEEN IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND (June 2017–December 2020)
- PART IV THE JOURNEY TOWARDS THE MEANING OF BREXIT (2020–)
- Conclusion
- Plate Section
- Index
Summary
During the many instances of political commotion, UK pundits claimed that the EU simply did not “get Northern Ireland” and failed to understand the place and its politics, which led it to design solutions skewed against the interests of the unionist community. The politics of Northern Ireland, however, is primarily the business of the UK and to some extent Ireland as co-guarantor of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement and its North–South cooperation. The EU entrusted the two signatory countries, Ireland and the UK, to ensure the full compatibility of the Brexit deal with the Good Friday Agreement. Could the UK have signed up and ratified the two agreed versions of the deal if they contradicted its international law obligations under the 1998 peace agreement? UK negotiators and governments had the support of top Whitehall lawyers to guarantee the compatibility between all of the UK's international obligations. Government lawyers never questioned the lawfulness of the Withdrawal Agreements in conversations with the EU. Politically, the UK government accepted the terms of the deal, which it recommended to Parliament. The accusation that the EU violated the Good Friday Agreement by ignoring unionist concerns is an odd one therefore, given the UK's own political and legal endorsement in 2019.
Saying the EU is not a signatory to the Good Friday Agreement does not downplay the need for Brussels to understand unionist concerns, which are key for the proper implementation of the agreed obligations. Since early 2018, Barnier's team went out of its way to have frequent contacts with a wide range of Northern Irish stakeholders and discuss the state of play of negotiations and possible ways forward. Whereas business leaders expressed qualms on what was coming out of the talks, the general feedback was that the solutions could work to the benefit of Northern Ireland's economy, with proper UK government support and preparation. Barnier himself was impressed on his visits to Northern Ireland by the discrepancy between the political polarization and the more pragmatic take from businesses and farming. His team often heard feedback from people in Northern Ireland that it gave them more information than London, at least until 2020.
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- Information
- Inside the DealHow the EU Got Brexit Done, pp. 183 - 186Publisher: Agenda PublishingPrint publication year: 2023