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27 - Price, quantity, and technology strategies for climate change policy

from Part IV - Policy design and decisionmaking under uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 December 2010

David W. Montgomery
Affiliation:
1201 F St. NW Ste. 700 Washington, DC 20004, USA
Anne E. Smith
Affiliation:
CRA International
Michael E. Schlesinger
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Haroon S. Kheshgi
Affiliation:
ExxonMobil Research and Engineering
Joel Smith
Affiliation:
Stratus Consulting Ltd, Boulder
Francisco C. de la Chesnaye
Affiliation:
US Environmental Protection Agency
John M. Reilly
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tom Wilson
Affiliation:
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto
Charles Kolstad
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Barbara
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Summary

Introduction

Cost-effective market approaches to environmental management all entail the use of some form of price signal, and they can generally be grouped as quantity-based or tax-based regulations. The quantity-based approach, in the form of “cap-and-trade” programs, has gained an especial popularity in the past two decades. The political acceptance of cap-and-trade over the tax approach has its roots in a favorable set of political attributes (Hahn and Stavins, 1991) and a successful experience with the Title IV SO2 cap. Its support among economists comes from its theoretical capability to achieve any stated cap at minimum cost. Most importantly, it has been accepted by those with a greater concern for environmental outcomes than for program costs, because the idea of a cap provides certainty of particular emissions levels in return for uncertainty about the costs of achieving those emissions levels.

Cap-and-trade was such a popular policy prescription during the 1990s that almost the entire discussion about climate change policy during that time was cast in terms of how to design a greenhouse gas (GHG) trading program, and how to build international agreements and institutions that could allow emission trading to function even where caps could not be directly imposed. (Joint implementation and the extensive set of rules and procedures surrounding the Clean Development Mechanism are examples of the latter.

Type
Chapter
Information
Human-Induced Climate Change
An Interdisciplinary Assessment
, pp. 328 - 342
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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