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10 - Concluding remarks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Robert B. Pippin
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Summary

A synthetic, conciliatory, or dialectical position like Hegel's, one that treats what had been considered antinomial alternatives as partial views of some more comprehensive true position, inspires an understandable skepticism. It is the “Have Your Cake and Eat It Too” skepticism we have noted several times. The particular issue in the preceding chapters was Hegel's theory of freedom. The interpretation defended was that Hegel has a rational agency theory of freedom. This means that he joins with Kant and Fichte in arguing (a) that a condition for both the inherent worth, the inherent dignity of a human life and the actual substance of a satisfying or fully realized human life is that it be a self-ruled or autonomous life, such that a subject can truly be said to be leading such a life and (b) that this condition can be fulfilled only if such a “leading” or self-rule can be understood as a self-constraint and self-direction by norms, only in so far as a subject is a rational agent. This is in effect the “Have Your Cake” part. The “Eat It Too” part emerges when we understand what Hegel considers to be the nature of such a rational agency, or how he understands the self- and other-relation constitutive of such agency. One could say that he conceives of such practical rationality as a “social practice,” or that he conceives of it “pragmatically,” or that he has a “historicized” or “dialogical” view of what counts as the appeal to reasons.

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Hegel's Practical Philosophy
Rational Agency as Ethical Life
, pp. 273 - 281
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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  • Concluding remarks
  • Robert B. Pippin, University of Chicago
  • Book: Hegel's Practical Philosophy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808005.010
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  • Concluding remarks
  • Robert B. Pippin, University of Chicago
  • Book: Hegel's Practical Philosophy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808005.010
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Concluding remarks
  • Robert B. Pippin, University of Chicago
  • Book: Hegel's Practical Philosophy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808005.010
Available formats
×