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4 - Military Commissions and the Paradigm of Prevention

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

David Cole
Affiliation:
Georgetown University Law Center
Fionnuala Ni Aoláin
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota School of Law
Oren Gross
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota School of Law
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Summary

WHY MILITARY COMMISSIONS? THAT IS THE CENTRAL question posed by President George W. Bush's decision to create the commissions in the first place, Congress's to authorize them twice in statutes enacted in 2006 and 2009, and President Barack Obama's to continue their use under his administration, notwithstanding his criticisms of them as a candidate. There is, no doubt, historical precedent for military commissions – but for the most part, that historical precedent involved materially different situations, in which military commissions were a matter of necessity, not discretion. Military commissions were employed, for example, where the military had ousted the existing government, and had to provide some venue for the enforcement of law as an occupying force. Moreover, their procedures have generally conformed to those of courts-martial. In the current circumstances, by contrast, there seems to be little or no necessity for military commissions. Most of the conduct charged and tried as war crimes in military commissions could be charged and tried in civilian criminal courts, under ordinary terrorism laws. If it is thought that a military court is particularly appropriate for the trial of war crimes, the preexisting and established system of courts-martial could have been employed.

Both the civilian criminal court and the court-martial are preferable venues for many reasons. They both have established track records. The United States has a robust civilian criminal justice system, in which many individuals have been tried successfully for terrorist crimes, both before and after September 11, 2001. The United States has an equally strong court-martial system, with rules of evidence that largely track those of civilian criminal courts, and in which thousands of criminal trials have been successfully conducted. The rules governing civilian criminal proceedings and courts-martial are clear, well settled, and have been subjected to and survived repeated constitutional testing. The judges are experienced in conducting trials. There is substantial precedent to guide their decisions, which decreases the likelihood of erroneous or arbitrary decision making, and in turn reduces the likelihood of long and costly appeals and retrials.

Type
Chapter
Information
Guantánamo and Beyond
Exceptional Courts and Military Commissions in Comparative Perspective
, pp. 95 - 116
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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References

Glazier, David, The Development of an Exceptional Court: The History of the American Military Commission, in this volume.
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
Fisher, Louis, Military Commissions: Problems of Authority and Practice, 24 B. U. Int'l L. J. 15, 34–39 (2006).
Banks, William C., Exceptional Courts in Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), in this volume.
Woodward, Bob, Bush at War 42 (2002) (emphasis added).
Cole, David, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (2003)
Cole, David and Lobel, Jules, Safe, Less, Free, Less: Why America Is Losing the War on Terrorism (2007).
Savage, Charlie, Glaberson, William, and Lehren, Andrew, Classified Files Offer New Insight into Detainees, NY Times, Apr. 24, 2011, at A1Google Scholar
Shane, Scott and Weiser, Benjamin, Judging Detainees’ Risk, Often with Flawed Evidence, NY Times, Apr. 24, 2011Google Scholar
Froomkin, Dan, Torture May Have Slowed Hunt for Osama, not Hastened It, Huffington Post (May 6, 2011, 4:48 PM), retrieved from Andrew Sullivan, The Big Lie, Ctd, The Daily Beast (May 4, 2011, 11:29 AM), retrieved from .
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§948(a)–(d) (2006).
Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a) (2009).
Glazier, David, Still a Bad Idea: Military Commissions under the Obama Administration 9–11 (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2010–32), pp. 65–86.Google Scholar
Roach, Kent, The Law Working Itself Pure? The Canadian Experience with Exceptional Courts and Guantánamo, in this volume. See also Glazier, David, A Court Without Jurisdiction: A Critical Assessment of the Military Commission Charges against Omar Khadr (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2010–37).Google Scholar
Denbeaux, Mark P. and Hafetz, Jonathan, eds., The Guantanamo Lawyers: Inside a Prison Outside the Law (2009), p. 196.

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